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I. Introduction
Increasingly, society has recognized the concerns posed by conflicts of
interest.' Conflicts of interest may compromise audit reports by accounting
firms, courtroom decisions by judges, and treatment decisions by physicians.
In several areas of the law, concerns about conflicts of interest play a critical
and widely recognized role. Codes of professional responsibility limit the
ability of lawyers to represent both sides of a dispute,2 principles of corporate
law prevent company directors from trading on inside information,3 and rules
of agency law prohibit trustees from mingling their own funds with those of the
trust.
4
Conflicts of interest also can play a critical role in shaping constitutional
doctrine. However, this role is seriously underappreciated. Occasionally,
courts and scholars mention conflicts concerns when discussing the Constitu-
1. By "conflicts of interest," I mean situations in which a person is trying to serve differ-
ent interests and satisfying one interest may come at the expense of another interest. For
example, if stock analysts for the automobile sector invest in General Motors, they may face a
conflict of interest between their duty to provide reliable analyses of car manufacturers to the
public and their desire to protect the value of their investment portfolio. With conflicts of inter-
est, individuals face competing interests, and service to one interest may entail sacrifice of the
other interests. Note that the competing interests may all be interests of other people, but they
may also include the individual's own interests.
Fields other than law, including medicine, recognize the importance of conflicts of interest.
See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RIc. L. REV. 155, 161-62 (1996) (discussing concerns that arise if physicians
receive greater compensation for delivering less care to their patients); Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physi-
cians, Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INrERNAL MED. 920, 920-21 (1992) (discussing
ethical considerations of cost-control proposals); Robert M. Veatch, Physicians and Cost Con-
tainment: The EthicalConflict, 30 JUIUMETRICS J. 461,466-70 (1990) (discussing concerns that
arise if physicians receive greater compensation for delivering less care to their patients).
2. See MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.7(a) (2000) (forbidding generally lawyers
from representing clients with directly adverse interests).
3. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13,47-52 (1998) (discussing how in-
sider trading law reflects common law agency principles).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959) (requiring trustee to keep trust
property separate from other non-trust property); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16009(a) (West 1991)
(same); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-6(bX5) (Michie 2000) (same); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 11-1.6(a) (McKinney 2001) (requiring fiduciary to keep property received as fiduciary
separate from his individual property).
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tion, but few writers really analyze the significance of conflicts of interest for
constitutional interpretation, and such analyses are usually limited to a single
area of doctrine.' Consequently, legal scholarship has not adequately consid-
ered how constitutional law accounts for, or should account for, conflicts of
interest.6
This Article offers a fuller discussion of conflicts of interest and constitu-
tional interpretation. In particular, this Article shows how consideration of
conflicts can help answer three leading puzzles in constitutional theory and
doctrine - the lack of a strong theory for separation of powers cases, the
tension between judicial supremacy and the political question doctrine, and
the question of whether Article V of the Constitution exclusively governs the
process of constitutional amendment.
First, responding to concerns about conflicts of interest can help resolve
a serious problem with the "functionalist" approach to separation of powers
issues.' The functionalist approach can explain Congress's power both to
create administrative agencies that exercise legislative power and to authorize
5. Some scholars discuss conflicts in the context of judicial supremacy, others in the
context of the political question doctrine, and still others when analyzing separation of powers
cases. Most notably, Paul Verkuil considered conflicts of interest in the context of the separation
of powers doctrine. See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea
of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 307 (1989) (proposing conflicts of interest
approach to separation of powers analysis). His writing sparked some commentary, primarily
in the symposium issue in which his article appeared. See Symposium, The American Constitu-
tional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1989) (pre-
senting four articles responding to Verkuil's article); see also WIIAAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING
OF THE SEPARATION OF PoWERS 128 n.1 (1965) (concluding that "purest version" of separation
of powers doctrine is "rule of law" version under which it is essential that people who make laws
not also administer them); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46
DUKE L.J. 679, 720-22 (1997) (criticizing Verkuil's conflicts of interest approach for omitting
role of politics); Martin H. Rdish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "fAngels Were to Govern": The Need
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation ofPowers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 498-501 (1991)
(criticizing Verkuil's approach for falling short of protecting values fostered by separation of
powers).
6. Indeed, it is not unusual for constitutional law treatises to lack an index entry for con-
flicts of interest. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrtriONAL LAW: PRINcIPLES AND PouCms
(2d ed. 2002) (giving no reference to conflicts of interest); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTIUIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999)
(same). Other treatises touch on conflicts of interest briefly. See 3 CHESTER JAMES ANTIFAU
& WIlliAM J. RICH, MoDERN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW, index at 17 (2d ed. 1997) (addressing
conflicts of interest to extent that they compromise criminal defendant's right to counsel); I
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1427 (3d ed. 2000) (indexing conflicts
of interest on four out of 1381 pages).
7. By "functionalist" approach, I refer to the idea that Congress may reallocate authority
among the three branches of the national government if the reallocation facilitates the function-
ing of the national government without too greatly undermining the division of authority among
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. See Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 702 (defining
functionalism).
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independent federal prosecutors that exercise executive authority without
presidential oversight. However, a functionalist approach has trouble estab-
lishing when Congress goes too far in reallocating national government author-
ity and thereby upsets the balance of power among the Congress, the President,
and the courts. In other words, while a functionalist approach responds to the
problems of the leading alternative theory - the "formalist" approach to separa-
tion of powers questions' - the functionalist analysis suffers from a lack of
identifiable limits. How do we know when a reallocation of power too greatly
undermines the constitutional structure? This Article argues that accounting
for conflicts of interest in constitutional interpretation can provide the limiting
principle needed to make functionalism work. Specifically, courts should
strike down legislation when it is likely that Congress passed the law to serve
its own self-interest.
Second, accounting for conflicts of interest can also resolve an important
tension that exists between Marbury v. Madison's9 principle of judicial
supremacy0 and the political question doctrine.1 Under current applications
of the political question doctrine, courts must try to explain why the judiciary
should not decide certain constitutional questions despite the fact that under
Marbury the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on constitutional ques-
tions. 2 Understanding Marbury and the political question doctrine in terms
of the concerns raised by conflicts of interest can establish a political question
doctrine that fits well with the principle of judicial supremacy. In particular,
8. By "formalist" approach, I refer to the idea that the national government's power is
divided among executive, legislative, and judicial tasks and that the different tasks can be car-
ried out only by the corresponding branch of the national government. See id. at 690 (defining
formalism).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (deciding that it is
sole province ofjudiciary "to say what the law is").
11. Under the political question doctrine, the political branches of government (the execu-
tive and the legislative branches) rather than the judicial branch should resolve certain disputes.
Accordingly, when faced with a political question, courts should dismiss the ease. See CHEM-
ERINSKY, supra note 6, at 127-28 (describing political question doctrine).
12. Although courts and scholars widely interpret Marbury as establishing a broad prin-
ciple of judicial supremacy, one can question whether such an interpretation is justified. See
GEOFFREYR. STONEET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 51-52 (4th ed. 2001) (arguing thatMarbury
gave courts authority to interpret and apply Constitution to cases before them, but no special
authority to be sole interpreters of Constitution).
For a recent statement of the Supreme Court's supremacy in constitutional interpretation,
see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000), in which the Court noted that
"Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitu-
tion." Detractors to the principle of judicial supremacy exist. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, The Law
of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-85 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of Constitution has less force than Constitution as supreme law itself).
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courts should abstain when their involvement would entail a serious conflict
of interest for them.
Finally, considering conflicts of interest can illuminate a third important
constitutional question - does Article V of the Constitution alone govern the
process for constitutional amendment? The amendment process described in
Article V is not stated in exclusive terms. That is, Article V indicates clearly
how an amendment may be passed, but it does not state explicitly that its
procedures are the only avenue for constitutional amendment. 3 This has led
a number of scholars to argue that constitutional amendments need not follow
the process spelled out in Article V. 4 However, a satisfactory principle is still
necessary to identify when an amendment need not follow Article V. Ac-
counting for conflicts of interest can supply that principle. Specifically,
Article V should not control the amendment process when a conflict of inter-
est would discourage Congress and the state legislatures from initiating the
Article V process.'
In short, from separation of powers concerns to the political question
doctrine and the constitutional amendment process, judging constitutional
questions according to the potential influence of conflicts of interest can bring
more coherence to constitutional law. 6
. Why Conflicts of Interest Matter
A. Concerns Raised by Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest matter because they can compromise decision
making, and they can do so in a number of ways. Before elaborating on the
harm from conflicts of interest, it is important to define the term. Conflicts
13. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing constitutional amendment processes).
14. Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar are two of the most prominent proponents of this
view. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text (discussing view that Article V is not
sole means of amending Constitution).
15. Under Article V, Congress or the state legislatures must launch the amendment
process. U.S. CONST. art. V.
16. Moreover, addressing concerns raised by conflicts of interest can also respond to an
important point made by Robert Pushaw. As he observed, scholars have generally analyzed
separation of powers questions separately from other doctrines that also address the allocation
of authority among the different branches of government. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justicia-
bility and Separation ofPowers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 393,396-
97 (1996) (observing that scholars treat justiciability and separation of powers as discrete
topics). Yet treating matters like the political question doctrine as distinct topics from those
issues traditionally addressed under separation of powers analysis is artificial. In fact, all issues
that implicate the allocation of authority among the branches of the national government are
questions about the separation of powers. Accordingly, we should anticipate a similarity of
analysis across the different issues. Thinking about conflicts of interest provides one common
approach.
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of interest occur in situations in which a decision maker's desire - or duty -
to serve conflicting interests might undermine the decision maker's neutrality
or objectivity.17 A conflict can arise when a decision maker represents the
interests of multiple other persons, and the interests are at odds with each
other. A conflict can also arise when the decision maker's own interests are
at stake.
For an example of a decision maker facing a conflict between the differ-
ent interests of other persons, consider a physician asked to ration a single
intensive care unit bed when two patients of the physician require intensive
care. Physicians assume a professional obligation to put the needs of their
patients first," but, in this case, the physician can only put one patient's needs
first. Or, suppose a lawyer provides estate planning for a husband and wife
and the couple decides to divorce. The lawyer has a duty of zealous advocacy
to both clients, but he would have difficulty fully carrying out that duty for
both clients.19
Although this kind of conflict is important in many areas of law, and also
in other professions, it is not a real concern for constitutional law. Constitu-
tional doctrine accepts the idea that Presidents, legislators, and judges will
consider and balance conflicting interests. In fact, it is an essential part of
these officials' roles to weigh the needs of some constituents or parties against
those of other constituents or parties.
The conflict of interest that matters for constitutional law is the conflict
created when public officials consider their own institutional or personal
interests. That is, constitutional doctrine should worry about situations in
which government officials might be influenced by the effect of their deci-
sions on their own power or welfare. Their own power or welfare has both
institutional and personal dimensions.
As to the institutional dimension of conflicts of interest, Presidents,
judges, and members of Congress are concerned with the amount of authority
they enjoy in their official capacity. When lawmakers act, the extent of their
authority may be at stake. Federal legislation might not only address an area
17. At one time, it was common for scholars to speak of "potential" versus "actual" con-
flicts of interest. Those terms are still sometimes used, but this Article speaks of weaker and
stronger conflicts of interest, on the ground that all conflicts of interest are actual conflicts, and
the question is whether the conflicts are severe enough that they are likely to influence the con-
flicted person's judgment or decision making.
18. See Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 161 (discussing fiduciary role of physicians with
respect to their patients); Veatch, supra note 1, at 469 (discussing duty of physician to patients).
19. Accordingly, state courts do not permit a lawyer to represent both spouses if their
divorce proceedings lead to courtroom litigation. Some states, however, permit a lawyer to
represent both spouses in mediation or negotiation of a divorce. See GEoFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
ET AL, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERNo 679-81 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing joint representa-
tion in context of divorce).
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of regulatory concern, like immigration; it might also enhance the power of
Congress at the expense of the executive branch.2" Or, when Congress de-
cides whether to require its approval before the President fires a political
appointee, the decision will implicate not only the need for oversight of the
executive branch, it will also implicate the extent of legislative authority in the
constitutional system.21
In addition to their institutional interests, lawmakers may have other
personal interests at stake. If Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson had owned
Microsoft stock when he was deciding the Justice Department's antitrust suit
against Microsoft,' his rulings would have affected not only the future of the
computer industry but his own wealth as well. Likewise, when members of
Congress vote on legislation that affects the fortunes of major contributors,
their positions may influence the flow of funds to their campaign treasuries.'
Whether institutional or financial, personal conflicts of interest are cause
for concern because government decision makers may not be trustworthy when
they have their own interests at stake. They no longer possess the necessary
degree of independence and neutrality. Justices hearing a challenge to Con-
gress's interpretation of provisions for the constitutional amendment process
may not be able to ignore the implications of their decision on the durability of
their constitutional holdings.24 A Congress writing legislation that would give
it the authority to employ legislative vetoes may not be able to dispassionately
weigh the advantages and disadvantages for the country of the veto authority.25
Judges, legislators, and Presidents must give consideration to a broad range of
interests, but they must not inject their own interests into the mix.26
20. This example is taken from INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra text
accompanying notes 4749, 14246 (discussing Chadha).
21. This example is taken from Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52(1926). See infra text
accompanying notes 128-29 (discussing Myers).
22. United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part, rev'd is
part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
23. Thus, for example, federal law prohibits payments to public officials with the intent
"to influence any official act." 18 U.S.C. § 201(bXIXA) (2001).
24. This example is taken from Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See infra text
accompanying notes 182-88 (discussing Coleman).
25. This example is taken from INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra text
accompanying notes 4749, 142-46 (discussing Chadha).
26. As James Madison wrote, "[n]o man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 131 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966) (drawing on
writings of John Locke); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 293-94, 34145, 369
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1988) (1690) (arguing that men cannot judge
their own cases and that civil government requires impartial third party to decide controversies).
To be sure, we do not expect governmental decision makers to be fully neutral. Senators
are supposed to give priority to the interests of their states' residents; representatives are sup-
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In short, by taking account of conflicts of interest, we can try to prevent
corruption in the decision making process. We worry that conflicts will cause
decision makers to unduly favor their own interests and sacrifice the interests
of other persons. Accordingly, it is important to ensure that lawmakers ex-
clude their personal interests from consideration.
There is a second important reason to keep a decision maker's personal
interests out of the picture. Whether or not personal interests actually influ-
ence a decision maker, there will be the appearance of impropriety. If the
federal courts could entertain appeals by federal judges of their impeachment
by the House and conviction by the Senate, and the Supreme Court reversed
a conviction, the public might wonder whether the merits or the Justices'
concern for their judicial colleague drove the decision.2 It may not matter
whether in fact the Justices were influenced by their sense of collegiality. The
important point is that the public cannot know whether collegial loyalty
shaped the vote.s Similarly, if Congress votes to require its approval before
the President can fire an executive branch official, we cannot know whether
the motivation behind the vote was the desire for adequate oversight of
presidential decisions or whether it was Congress's desire for greater power.
Appearances of impropriety undermine public trust even when nothing
untoward has occurred.
B. Conflicts of Interest and Constitutional Theory
It not only makes good sense to take account of conflicts of interest in
constitutional analysis; avoiding conflicts also ties into fundamental constitu-
tional principles.' Our constitutional system is ultimately premised on a rule
of law that applies to everyone."0 In the words of John Locke, "[n]o man in
posed to give priority to the interests of their districts' residents. Still, we do not want senators,
representatives, or other government officials to give priority to their own interests.
27. This example is taken from Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). See infra
text accompanying notes 172-81 (discussing Nixon).
28. To be sure, courts might be unduly harsh when reviewing an impeachment and con-
viction of a judge out of anger for the harm done to the judiciary by their errant colleague. But
that possibility does not change the fact that the public could view a lenient court as acting out
of a conflict of interest. Indeed, the possibility of both undue lenience and undue harshness
further reinforces the concern that a reviewing court might bring inappropriate considerations
to its decision.
29. William Gwyn and Paul Verkuil have been important voices in articulating this view.
See GWYN, supra note 5, at 128 n.1 (stating that if same people make and execute laws, they
have unbounded power); Verkuil, supra note 5, at 307 (proposing conflict of interest approach
to separation of powers issues).
30. See GWYN, supra note 5, at 38 (explaining argument that even Parliament must obey
its own laws); Verkuil, supra note 5, at 303-07 (discussing rule of law approach to separation
of powers).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE CONSTITUTION
civil society can be exempted from the laws of it."31 Avoiding conflicts of
interest helps ensure that government officials are not able to exploit their
positions to secure institutional or other personal advantages to which they
have no entitlement. We want our executive officers, judges, and legislators
to make decisions in the public interest rather than in their own interest.
32
The concern about conflicts of interest is obvious in some constitutional
provisions and more implicit in others. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' guarantees of due process, for example, mean that judges must be
neutral decision makers and therefore must not decide eases in which their
own interests are at stake.3 Likewise, by dividing the powers of the national
government in Articles I, II, and Ill, the Constitution provides a mechanism
to limit government officials from exploiting their positions to serve their
institutional interests. If the different branches of government must share the
national power and be, subject to the checks and balances of the other
branches, they will find it much more difficult to abuse their authority for
their own interests.
34
The remainder of this Article discusses how to better understand consti-
tutional doctrine from the perspective of avoiding situations in which govern-
ment officials face a conflict of interest between their governmental duties and
their own interests. Each branch of government must consider the interests
of different constituencies and the demands of different principles, as conflicts
will often arise among these different constituencies or principles. It is part
of the duty of government to resolve these conflicts. However, it is not
acceptable for government officers to decide on the basis of their own institu-
tional or personal interests. Government officials must not compromise their
duties to the public in order to satisfy their loyalties to themselves.
31. LOCKE, supra note 26, at 348.
32. As public choice theory argues, there may not be a "public interest" for Congress to
serve. Rather, legislators may simply be choosing among competing private interests. See
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 223-24 (1986) (discussing interest
group or economic theory of legislation).
Public choice theory has spawned much debate, but whether it is empirically or norma-
tively valid is not critical to my argument. Even if legislators are not expected to serve an
overarching public interest (a claim belied by Madison's concern about the national govern-
ment's ability to control factions, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 29 (1985), who discusses dissatisfaction with the influence of inter-
est groups on government decisions), legislators should not be using their governmental power
to advance their own interests.
33. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1972) (discussing Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
34. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
433 (1987) (discussing justifications for constitutional distribution of national powers).
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 713 (2002)
One final introductory point. As previously observed, government
officials face conflicts of interest that implicate a range of personal interests,
including institutional and financial interests. This Article addresses the insti-
tutional dimension of such conflicts of interest.
IN. Conflicts of Interest and Constitutional Interpretation
Accounting for conflicts of interest has its greatest relevance to cases that
turn on the division of authority among the three branches of the national
government. This is not surprising - there is significant overlap between the
principle of dividing power among different branches of government and the
desire to avoid conflicts of interest. When the Framers of the Constitution
proposed a tripartite national government, they sought to limit the accumula-
tion of power in the new government." Too much power in the hands of a
single national authority would pose too great a risk of tyranny,36 a quintessen-
tial abuse of authority. Just as the concern about abuse of authority is a key
concern behind the separation of powers, so is it a key concern about conflicts
of interest. When individuals that exercise power face a personal conflict of
interest, we worry that they will misuse their power for their own good rather
than for the good of the public."
Indeed, one can view the separation of powers as a key strategy for
minimizing the effects of conflicts of interest. It is in the institutional interest
of public officials to enlarge their power - with a few exceptions, people
exhibit a strong desire to increase their authority. Accordingly, in designing
our national government, it was important for the Framers to counter the risk
of corruption from conflicts of interest. One possible approach was to appeal
to the good faith of government officials.3" However, as James Madison
observed when discussing factions in the political process, public officials
will inevitably bring their own interests to the table, and it will be more
effective to respond with mechanisms that cabin the effects of conflicts of
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 355-57 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1966) (discussing constitutional safeguards against accumulation of power).
36. See GEOFFREYR. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 388 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing
purposes of constitutional distribution of power).
37. Still, concern about conflicts transcends separation of powers, as discussed in sub-
sequent Parts of this Article.
38. Appeals to good faith are common. For example, when the American College of
Physicians (an organization of specialists in internal medicine) issued guidelines on the conflicts
of interest raised by relationships between physicians and drug companies, it did not specify the
kinds of gifts that physicians could or could not accept. Rather, the College recommended that
physicians decline gifts from drug companies when they would not "be willing to have these
arrangements generally known." Am. Coll. of Physicians, Position Paper, Physicians and the
Phanmaceutical Industry, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 624, 624 (1990).
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interest rather than to respond by asking government officers to put their self-
interest aside. 9 Thus, rather than relying on legislators, Presidents, and judges
to put the public interest first, the structure of our constitutional system makes
it difficult for government officers to put their personal interests first. By
dividing power among three branches of government and employing different
checks and balances, the Constitution frustrates efforts by government offi-
cials to exploit their authority for their own gain. In short, if one is concerned
about minimizing the influence of conflicts of interest in government, one
would look to the separation of powers for assistance.
If conflicts of interest concerns are simply a different way of characteriz-
ing separation of power concerns, it is worth asking what a focus on conflicts
will add to separation of powers doctrine. If conflicts of interest concerns
only reiterate what we already know, will we learn anything new from a con-
sideration of conflicts?
This Article argues that consideration of conflicts can bring important
definition to separation of powers doctrines that are plagued by openended-
ness or serious tension. Taking account of conflicts of interest can also help
with constitutional questions that separation of powers principles do not
reach. This Article illustrates each of these benefits with specific examples.
First, this Article argues that taking account of conflicts can be a response to
the lack of identifiable limits in the functionalist approach to separation of
powers cases, thereby giving us a strong separation of powers theory. Second,
it demonstrates how consideration of conflicts can overcome the current ten-
sion that exists in constitutional law between the principle of judicial suprem-
acy and the political question doctrine. Finally, this Article demonstrates how
consideration of conflicts can help ensure that the public has a genuine oppor-
tunity to amend the Constitution when Congress or the state legislatures are
likely to be unresponsive to the citizenry's desire for amendment.
A. Separation of Powers and Conflicts of Interest
For many years, scholars have debated how the Supreme Court should
review challenges to laws that. reallocate authority among the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches. On one hand, the Constitution seems to
envision a separation of powers among the three branches, with the President
responsible for the executive power, Congress for the legislative power, and
the federal courts for the judicial power.4" Accordingly, if power that be
39. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 131-32 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1966) ("[T]he causes of faction cannot be removed, and... relief is only to be sought in
the means of controlling its effects.") (emphasis in original).
40. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577 (1984) (describing separation of powers
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longed to one branch ended up in the hands of government officials outside
of that branch, we would have an apparent violation of the Constitution. On
the other hand, the necessities of the modem state demand innovative govern-
ment institutions like administrative agencies and independent commissions
that combine executive, judicial, and legislative activities but that may not be
part of the original constitutional framework. If the Court does not allow
some flexibility in the constitutional joints, the national government will not
be able to meet its responsibilities to the public.4"
From these competing considerations, we might conclude that a strict
application of separation of powers principles provides a framework that is
generally useful but that can accept deviation when justified by underlying
theory. In this view, the key question is whether our interpretations of the
Constitution's separation of powers are ultimately faithful to constitutional
principle. Alternatively, we might conclude that unwavering adherence to the
original framework is necessary. In this view, those building the constitu-
tional framework considered the trade-off between clear rules that limit
flexibility and guiding principles that offer greater flexibility, but are typically
vague, and came down in favor of clear rules for separation of powers ques-
tions.
42
With two important perspectives, two leading schools of thought have
emerged regarding separation of powers doctrine. One school advocates a
formal analysis that requires a strict separation of powers, the other a func-
tional analysis that permits flexibility. Some Supreme Court decisions employ
formalist analysis; other decisions take a functionalist approach.
1. Formalism
In the formalist view, the critical question is whether a reallocation of
authority would cause a departure from the tripartite division of power enunci-
ated in the Constitution. If, for example, Congress tries to give itself authority
to engage in executive action, it would be overstepping its bounds. Thus, in
as separation of acts performed by each branch).
41. Thus, for several decades now, the Supreme Court has rarely questioned delegations
of authority by Congress to the executive branch. See STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 365-67
(discussing nondelegation doctrine). For the Court's most recent affirmation of congressional
delegations of authority, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-76
(2001), in which the Court discussed non-delegation doctrine.
42. For more discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of clear rules, see DAVID
ORENIuCHER, MATiERS OF LIFE AND DEATH MAKING MoRAL THEORY WoRK IN MEDICAL
ETIcs AND THE LAW 11-15 (2001), discussing rules and moral principle. See generally
FREDERICK ScHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMIATION OF RULE-
BASED DECION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) (analyzing role of rules in decision
making in all areas of life and society).
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Bowsher v. Synar,43 the Court struck down the balanced budget act because
it authorized the Comptroller General to specify spending reductions in the
event that Congress exceeded its budget targets in future years.' The Comp-
troller General is a member of the legislative branch, and the Court observed
that Congress may not exercise control over "an officer charged with the
execution of the laws" (in this case the execution of the balanced budget act)
because the "structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws. 45
Just as Congress could violate the Constitution by assuming executive
power for itself, it would also violate the Constitution, according to formalists,
if Congress transferred legislative or judicial power to the executive branch.
Thus, in the view of Gary Lawson and other formalists, administrative agen-
cies violate the Constitution because they both exercise legislative power dele-
gated by Congress and engage in judicial activities.46
Congress might violate the division of power in a third way - by trying
to legislate without meeting the Constitution's requirements for approving
legislation. In INS v. Chadha,47 the Court invalidated the legislative veto' on
the ground that the exercise of the veto constituted legislative action without
the consent of both houses of Congress and presentment to the President.49
Formalism may provide answers to a number of constitutional questions,
but it has serious difficulties as a theory. The necessities of the modem state
demand innovative government institutions, like administrative agencies, that
exercise broad discretion and that combine executive, judicial, and legislative
activities, or independent officers and commissions that exercise national
43. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
44. See Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,732-34(1986) (findingthat Comptroller General
was executive officer over which Congress improperly exercised control).
45. Id. at 726.
46. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1231, 1233-49 (1994) (discussing death of constitutional government). The Supreme Court has
not followed formalist thinking in the example of administrative agencies. See id. at 1240-41
(lamenting Court's failure to overturn statutes that establish and govern administrative agencies
on nondelegation grounds). Lawson also criticizes administrative agencies because they operate
beyond the direct control of the President, thereby undermining presidential control of the
executive branch. See id. at 1241-46 (discussing unitary executive).
47. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
48. With a legislative veto, either the House or Senate (or a House or Senate committee)
acting alone has authority to veto action taken by the executive branch to implement a statute.
Federal statutes commonly included legislative veto provisions until the Supreme Court found
the provisions unconstitutional in Chadha. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) (observing that invalidation of legislative veto affected "nearly 200 other"
statutes).
49. See id. at 946-55 (discussing presentment and bicameralism).
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power outside of the three traditional branches of government. ° As the
Supreme Court has observed, "our jurisprudence has been driven by a practi-
cal understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. 5 Innova-
tion in government is driven not only by practicalities. It also reflects underly-
ing principles. While the separation of powers was designed to protect liberty
by dividing instead of concentrating national power, it was also designed to
foster efficiency of operations by the national government.52 Innovative
institutions permit greater efficiency.
Even if we wanted to follow a fbrmalist approach, it is impossible to do
so. We cannot develop independent definitions of executive, judicial, and
legislative action and assign those actions to their corresponding branch of
government.5 3 As James Madison observed: "Experience has instructed us
that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate
and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces - the legislative,
executive and judiciary."'54 Inevitably, officials in the executive or judicial
branch will do the same kinds of things when they exercise executive or judi-
50. In addition, it is by no means clear that the modem administrative state is inconsistent
with the constitutional structure envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. Cf Sunstein,
supra note 34, at 430 (observing that "separation of powers is in important respects a mischar-
acterization of the constitutional system").
51. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,372 (1989). The Mistretta Court also quoted
an earlier opinion in which it had written that "' [t]he Constitution has never been regarded as
denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable
it to perform its function."' Id. (quoting Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935)).
52. See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 303-04 (discussing purpose of separation of powers).
53. See William B. Owyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Fed-
eral Courts, 57 OEO. WASH. L. REv. 474, 476 (1989) (noting lack of definition in Constitution
of executive, legislative, and judicial categories). Even proponents of formalism acknowledge
the difficulty of the definitional problem. See Lawson, supra note 46, at 1238 n.45 (observing
that "[t]he problem of distinguishing the three functions of government has been, and continues
to be, one of the most intractable puzzles in constitutional law"); Steven 0. Calabresi, The
Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1390 n.47 (1994) (recognizing that
this definitional task is "a difficult and perhaps an insuperable" one).
54. THE FEDERALST No. 37, at 269 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1966). Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson confirmed Madison's observation. In his
opinion, Scalia admits of "no possible doubt" in his conclusion that "prosecution of crimes is
a quintessentially executive function." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Yet, several scholars have found from the historical record that law enforcement
was also seen as a judicial and legislative function. See Harold Krent, Executive Control Over
CriminalLaw Enforcement: Some Lessonsfrom History, 38 Am U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (giving
historical account of legislative role in law enforcement); Owyn, supra note 53, at 484-94
(discussing role of federal judiciary in criminal prosecution).
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cial power that members of Congress do when they pass legislation. Thus, for
example, when the Chadha Court characterized legislative action as "action
that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and rela-
tions of persons,... all outside the Legislative Branch,"5 the Court necessar-
ily included in its characterization executive orders issued by the President,56
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies,57 and opinions handed
down by courts. 5
The Court has illustrated the definitional problem in other opinions. In
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc.,59 the Court invalidated a review board composed of nine
members of Congress.' According to the Court, the review board violated
separation of powers principles if it exercised legislative power because, in
conformity with the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, Congress
must exercise that power as a whole, and not through just nine of its
members.6 ' Alternatively, if the review board exercised executive power, its
action was still unconstitutional because members of the legislative branch
cannot usurp executive prerogatives.62 But if formalist analysis is correct in
viewing executive and legislative functions as distinctive, then the Court
should have been able to determine whether the review board engaged in
legislative or executive action.63
One could make formalist analysis work in a tautological way. One
could say that, when the legislature is acting, it is engaging in legislative
action and it therefore must follow the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments of Article I. Similarly, when executive branch officials are acting, they
are engaging in executive action and therefore must be subject to the oversight
55. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
56. Consider, for example, the effects on people's rights and duties when the President
sets aside millions of acres of land as a federal wilderness area.
57. In other words, formalist thinking requires a serious revival of the nondelegation
doctrine. See Lawson, supra note 46, at 1237-41 (discussing "the demise of the nondelegation
doctrine").
58. Efforts by scholars to define legislative action are no more successful than the Court's
effort in Chadha. Gary Lawson, for example, suggests the admittedly circular formulation that
"Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory
scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." Id. at 1239.
59. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
60. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (concluding that review board was impermissible expansion of
Congress's confined legislative role).
61. Id. at 277.
62. Id. at 275-76.
63. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1735-36
(1996) (discussing Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority).
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 713 (2002)
of the President rather than Congress or the judiciary.' But tautological
approaches do not tie doctrine to theory. Presidents could easily encroach
upon legislative prerogatives because by definition whatever they do is execu-
tive action.
Formalist analysis is problematic also because it rests on a faulty view that
the powers of the three branches of government are distinct and separated
powers. In fact, the Constitution envisions not only some separation of powers,
but also some sharing of powers. The President and Congress, for example,
enjoy authority with respect to the waging of war.'5 And while Congress
decides whether to pass legislation, the President can sign or veto congressio-
nal bills.' As Richard Neustadt observed, rather than characterizing our
system as one that separates power, it is more accurate to speak ofthe Constitu-
tion as separating institutions and requiring them to share power.'
2. Functionalism
Many scholars respond to the problems of formalist analysis by support-
ing a functional approach to separation ofpowers cases. In this view, realloca-
tions of power are permitted to ensure that the national government has
the flexibility to adapt to the demands of the modem state. A model of strict
separation may have been possible two hundred years ago when the national
government had relatively few employees and little regulatory responsibility,
but not at a time when the government needs vast bureaucracies to oversee far-
64. As Justice Stevens observed in his concurring opinion in Bowsher v. Synar, the
majority opinion seemed to employ a tautological approach to separation of powers analysis.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 751 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing character-
ization of Comptroller General's action under balanced budget law). The Court struck down
the balanced budget law at issue because it gave the Comptroller General, an official of the
legislative branch, authority to execute the law by specifying budget cuts to meet the deficit
targets. See id. at 732-34 (finding that Congress improperly retained control over executive
function through Comptroller General). Because executive branch officers must perform execu-
tive action, the Comptroller General's role in implementing the law was invalid. However, the
Court upheld the law's fallback provision, which entailed the passage by Congress of the report
that the Comptroller General would have issued. See id. at 734-36 (discussing issue of remedy).
Thus, the same action - issuance of the Comptroller General's report - would be executive
action if performed by the Comptroller General but legislative action if performed by Congress.
65. The President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States... when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1. Congress has the power to "declare War," to "raise and support Armies," and to "provide and
maintain a Navy." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 11-13.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that "[ilf he [the President] approve[s] he shall
sign it [the bill], but if not he shall return it").
67. See RIcHARD E. NEUsTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POwER 101 (1976) (stating that constitu-
tional convention "created a government of separated institutions sharing powers").
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reaching and complicated legislation." In a number of cases, the Court em-
ployed functionalist analysis to rebuff separation of powers challenges. The
Court upheld the ability of Congress to create administrative agencies and
independent commissions69 and to enact an independent counsel law.70 Ac-
cording to the Court, it is important to look at underlying purposes of the
Constitution's separation of powers provisions rather than adhering to "'doctri-
naire reliance on formal categories."'
Functionalist analysis does not permit all reallocations of authority. If
Congress is to stretch the Article I, II, and III boundaries, it must do so for
innovations that are "needed, "72 not those that are merely convenient or help-
ful. In addition, a proposed reallocation can go too far in its innovation and
disrupt the Constitution's careful balance of power. If one branch's authority
is usurped too much, it cannot serve its role as a check and balance against the
power of the other branches.73
A key problem with functionalist analysis as a constitutional doctrine is
its openendedness.74 Identifying whether a reallocation of authority goes too
far in disrupting the balance of power is a difficult endeavor. If the Supreme
Court had upheld the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha, would Congress have
thereby become too powerful?" Conversely, as Justice White suggested in his
dissent, would Congress only have had the ability to limit the transfer of
68. See Strauss, supra note 40, at 583-86 (discussing agency function and structure).
69. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding creation of United
States Sentencing Commission); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(upholding establishment of Federal Trade Commission).
70. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding independent counsel pro-
visions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which allowed for appointment of independent
persons to investigate and prosecute high-ranking members of executive branch).
71. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-848 (1986)
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Ag. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985)) (discussing applica-
tion of separation of powers analysis to Article I of Constitution).
72. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (noting that while formalistic rules may lend greater coher-
ence in deciding when Congress can authorize adjudication of Article M business in non-Article
Ili tribunals, such rules could constrict Congress's ability to take needed action); see also
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (discussing Court's recognition of
"necessity" of provisions by which Congress delegates authority to administrative agencies).
73. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-95 (discussing reasons why independent counsel law
does not unduly interfere with executive branch).
74. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1127, 1144-45 (2000) (criticizing indefiniteness and difficulty in applying functional-
ism's separation of powers standards); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 225, 234-35 (1991) (criticizing nebulousness of
functionalism's underlying concepts).
75. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing Chadha).
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 713 (2002)
authority to the administrative agencies of the national government? 6 In their
functionalist analyses, scholars and courts cite the need for flexibility in the
constitutional system to accommodate the necessities of the modem world, but
they do not give much guidance in deciding whether such accommodations
have gone too far." According to one characterization of functionalist analy-
sis, the issue addressed is whether a "contested action usurps a function con-
stitutionally reserved to [an]other branch or whether it threatens to interfere
substantially with operations of the other branch of government."78
If the benchmark for courts is to ensure that they do not permit too great
an accumulation of power in one or another branch of the national govern-
ment, it may be too hazy of a benchmark to give much guidance.79 To be sure,
this kind of fuzziness is a common problem in constitutional law. Consider,
for example, the inquiry into whether certain rights are protected as funda-
mental rights because they are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'" 0
Still, the lack of clarity in fumctionalist analysis of separation of powers ques-
tions can be substantially greater than with other constitutional questions. It
is often clear whether recognition of an equal protection or substantive due
process claim will have a significant impact on individual liberty (as illus-
trated by Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade 2). However, it is
much more difficult to predict the effect of an alteration in the national govern-
ment's balance of power. In a subsequent subpart, this Article recommends
a conflict of interest analysis as a way to bring some clarity to functionalist
analysis of separation of powers questions.
76. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on
congressional use of legislative veto).
77. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 5, at 454, 476-77 (commenting on functionalism's
lack of limitations for validating inter-branch usurpations of power). As Cass Sunstein
observed, the functionalist approach "allows for a large degree of discretion (and therefore
uncertainty) both in characterizing the appropriate constitutional commitment and in deciding
whether it has been violated." Sunstein, supra note 34, at 496.
78. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74
VA. L. REV. 1253, 1283 (1988). Krent recommends a two-step analysis, asking first whether
the branches acted within their constitutional restraints and, if so, whether there was an undue
threat to the balance of power. See id. at 1256-57 (describing two-step analysis).
79. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 5, at 476-77 (discussing "intellectual bankruptcy" of
functionalist approach).
80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Conn.,
302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)) (discussing substantive due process rights).
81. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding separate educational
facilities for whites and blacks inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional).
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding constitutional right to abortion for
pregnant women), modified, Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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3. Judicial Abstention
Some scholars have abandoned formalism and functionalism and turned
to other ways to analyze separation of powers problems.8 3 For example,
courts might adopt a Holmesian abstention approach. 4 Under this model,
courts would abstain from deciding disputes about the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches."5 Instead, they would rely on
the constitutional structure of separate and competing powers to prevent the
accretion of too much power in either of the other branches of government.8 6
In this view, when the Constitution established the three branches of govern-
ment and divided power among them, it did so in a way that would ensure that
each branch would have sufficient authority to prevent one branch from
becoming too powerful. Because the structure is self-protecting, no need for
courts to intervene arises."7
The problem with the Holmesian model is that it demands an abdication
of responsibility by the judiciary. If this model is premised on the nature of the
constitutional structure, then it cannot require the judicial branch to renounce
its constitutional role. An uninvolved judiciary results in the elimination of an
important check on the power of the executive and legislative branches.
In addition, even accepting the idea that the constitutional structure is
designed such that the executive and legislative branches can protect their
authority from each other, we cannot always assume that the structure works
as intended. Even well-designed systems sometimes fail, and the judiciary
needs to step in when the system fails. This criticism of the Holmesian ap-
proach is analogous to John Hart Ely's justification for the ability of courts to
override the legislature on constitutional grounds. Although representative
democracy is designed to deliver just outcomes, the representative process may
break down.8 People possessing power may "chok[e] offthe channels ofpolit-
ical change" to preserve their status and prevent the disempowered in society
83. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 766-79 (arguing for more fluid theory that would
judge challenged action in terms of whether action promotes principles of participation and
accountability); Merrill, supra note 74, at 235-59 (arguing for "minimal conception" of sep-
aration of powers doctrine that would require all federal agencies to be located within - and be
accountable to - one of national government's three branches); Redish & Cisar, supra note 5,
at 474-90 (advocating for "pragmatic" form of formalism).
84. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 494-95 (describing Holmesian approach).
85. See id. at 494 (stating that under Holmesian approach, separation of powers issues are
nonjusticiable).
86. See id. at 494-95 (describing Holmesian approach).
87. See id. at 494 (stating that Holmesian nonjusticiability view is based on each branch's
ability to protect itself).
88. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW
102-03 (1980) (discussing Ely's approach to constitutional adjudication).
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from using the democratic process to effect change. 9 In Ely's view, judicial
intervention is necessary to respond to breakdowns in process in order to rein-
force the operation of representative democracy Similarly, judicial interven-
tion is sometimes necessary to reinforce our separation of powers structure.
4. Appealing to Principle - Functionalism Limited by Conflicts of Interest
Turning to the fundamental principles underlying our constitutional sys-
tem of government can help sort out the debate over separation of powers
theory. We know that the Framers designed the structure of the national gov-
ernment, with its division of authority, to serve two important goals - effi-
ciency and liberty.91 A division of authority promotes efficiency in several
ways. For example, by pairing a single executive with the legislative branch,
the Constitution gave the government someone who could act with decisive-
ness, speed, and secrecy.' Dividing authority also promotes efficiency be-
cause different types of power draw on different skills and expertise. Consider,
for example, the skills required to shepherd legislation through Congress, to
administer an executive branch, or to decide lawsuits.
In addition to promoting efficiency, the division of authority promotes
liberty by thwarting tyranny. With a division of authority, there is a dispersion,
rather than a concentration, of power. Moreover, public officials will find it
more difficult to place themselves above the law when power resides elsewhere
in government.93 Members of Congress that pass laws are subject to the Presi-
dent's execution of the laws, and both are subject to the judiciary's interpreta-
tion of the law. Tyranny is prevented not only because power is divided but
also because it is shared, with the different branches of government enjoying
checks and balances over the other branches of government. Absent a super-
majority, for example, Congress cannot pass legislation without the President's
signature, and the President cannot appoint judges or senior executive officials
without the advice and consent of the Senate.94
89. See id. at 103 (discussing when malfunction of representative process occurs).
90. See id. at 102 (discussing means to facilitate representative democracy).
91. See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 303-04 (discussing purposes of separation of powers).
92. See id. at 303 (discussing efficiency); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Argu-
ments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 37-39 (1995) (discussing arguments for
unitary executive); Pushaw, supra note 16, at 402-03 (discussing justifications for separation
of powers).
93. See id. at 403 (discussing separation of powers justifications); Verkuil, supra note 5,
at 305-06 (discussing analytical advantages of rule of law rationale for separation of powers).
94. See WALTER F. MuRPHYET AL.,AMERICANCONST1orrONAL INTERPRETATION 61,
424-25 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing institutional structure of federal government).
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While the advantages of a division of governmental authority were well-
recognized before the founding of the United States, the Framers of the Con-
stitution incorporated a novel, critical feature to further protect liberty from
governmental tyranny. They vested governmental authority in the people, and
they therefore made the national government accountable to the people.95 The
President and members of Congress have to answer to the electorate by running
for reelection if they want to remain in office.' The people cannot vote federal
judges out of office, but they can press Congress to override the courts on non-
constitutional matters, and they can seek a constitutional amendment to over-
ride the courts on constitutional matters.
What do the fundamental constitutional principles of efficiency, liberty,
and accountability say about the separation of powers doctrine? First, the goal
of efficiency pushes us toward a functionalist analysis. If a reallocation of
authority is necessary to respond to the necessities of governing, then a failure
of the reallocation to fit within a formalist framework should not doom it. If
we are to respect underlying principle, the national government should be able
to adopt innovations that promote greater efficiency.' Indeed, in upholding
the independent counsel law and the United States Sentencing Commission, the
Court recognized that Congress must have the freedom to develop new struc-
tures and allocations of authority to respond to the demands and necessities of
governing.s
In addition to a theory that allows for flexibility, we need a theory that
does not permit the government to compromise the interests of liberty and
accountability. In other words, we need a theory that balances the need for
95. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part)
(describing principle that authority granted by Congress must have adequate limiting standards);
see also Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 725-34, 767-73 (discussing representation and separation
of powers, and constitutional commitment to accountability); Pushaw, supra note 16, at 411-12
(discussing relocation of sovereignty with "the people"); Redish & Cisar, supra note 5, at 451
(describing accountability as device to combat concentration of power); David Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICK. L. REV. 1223, 1237-38
(1985) (citing and quoting Arizona v. California); Bernard Schwartz, OfAdministrators and
Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
443, 445 (1977) (describing principle that authority granted by Congress must have adequate
limiting standards).
96. Originally, the Constitution did not impose term limits on the President. In 1951, the
Twenty-Second Amendment incorporated a two-term limit. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
97. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1526 (1991) (criticizing formalist analysis for not permitting national government to
"respond to new needs in creative ways").
98. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (noting that separation of
powers must be understood flexibly to ensure effective national government); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988) (observing that need to fashion workable government
precludes requirement of strict separation of powers).
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innovation with the need to prevent both tyranny and the loss of accountability.
Functionalist analysis purports to provide that balance, but we return to the
problem of knowing when an innovation requires too great a sacrifice of liberty
or accountability. As discussed above, such interests are inherently difficult
to measure in the context of allocating national authority. Do independent
agencies and commissions dilute the power of the executive branch too much
by limiting its control over the execution of the laws;" or, conversely, do
independent agencies and commissions allow Congress to engage in necessary
delegations of authority without creating an executive branch that is too
powerful?
In short, separation of powers doctrine needs a principle that will provide
some tangible limits to a functional type of analysis. As suggested earlier, the
need for limiting principles is a common need in constitutional law.'" When
the Supreme Court recognizes fundamental rights of liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, it needs some way to avoid
unprincipled expansion of that concept. Most might agree that liberty rights
include the freedom to make important individual decisions, but people will
have difficulty agreeing on a way to distinguish important decisions from those
that do not merit constitutional protection. ' If we say, for example, that
people must be free to shape their sense of personhood, we can explain why
individuals have the right to make decisions about marriage and procreation.
However, we have trouble explaining why states can outlaw polygamy," 2 or
why a police department can prohibit its officers from wearing beards or
growing their hair long enough to touch their ears.103 Accordingly, the Court
has looked for limiting principles to avoid the boundless expansion of liberty
rights. Sometimes the Court invokes tradition as a source of fundamental
rights;"' other times it places matters of family and bodily integrity at the heart
99. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1165-68 (1992) (describing unaccepta-
bility to "unitary executive theorists" of independent commissions exercising executive author-
ity); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991 (1993) (observing that historical
evidence demonstrates Framers' intent to have President accountable for all executive action).
One might also argue that federal agencies and commissions are more problematic in their
exercise of legislative power than in their independence from presidential oversight.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 (discussing fuzziness of functionalism).
101. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 752-70 (1989)
(discussing difficulty in determining inviolable human qualities).
102. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1946) (discussing historical
treatment of polygamy in law).
103. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976) (discussing deference to police
department in organizing and equipping its officers).
104. See Washington v. Qlucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720-21 (1997) (discussing methods of
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of liberty." Analogous limiting principles are lacking, however, in functional-
ist theory for separation of powers questions.
Conflicts of interest analysis can provide a principle to limit functionalism
in separation of powers theory. Although courts may have difficulty deciding
directly whether a reallocation of authority goes too far in disrupting the
balance of power, they can look for indirect evidence of disruption by consider-
ing the quality of the legislative process that led to the reallocation. When
substantive standards are difficult to fashion, procedural standards often
provide a good alternative. In other words, if it is difficult to know whether
the outcome is appropriate, a court can look to whether there was a breakdown
in process that would lessen confidence in the substantive results. Thus, for
example, John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement justifies
judicial intervention on constitutional grounds when the majoritarian process
appears to give inadequate voice to a particular group's interests (as with a
racial minority's interest). 1°6 The role of the courts, in Ely's view, is to rein-
force the representative process, because only a properly functioning represen-
tative process can produce substantive choices that bind society.
Conflicts of interest considerations factor in when judging the adequacy
of the process. In the context of the reallocation of national authority, evi-
dence that self-interest rather than public interest motivated Congress would
indicate a breakdown in process." When conflicts of interest may influence
decisions, the trustworthiness of the results is questionable. In such cases, it
is less likely that the reallocation is designed to foster the functioning of the
national government and more likely that the reallocation is designed to serve
the institutional interests of Congress. Indeed, in subsequent discussion of
separation of powers cases, this Article shows how legislation that was prob-
lematic on conflicts of interest grounds was also sometimes problematic in
terms of identifying a genuine functional purpose of the legislation.1"
How would separation of powers theory incorporate conflicts of interest
concerns as a limiting principle for functionalist analysis? For a reallocation
identifying substantive due process rights); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)
(same).
105. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (noting that
Constitution limits states' ability to interfere with basic family decisions).
106. See ELY, supra note 88, at 101-04 (outlining his theory briefly). Ely reaches his
process-oriented theory after rejecting the different candidates for a substantive theory of judi-
cial intervention. See id. at 43-72 (discussing fundamental principles that may apply to inter-
preting open-ended constitutional provisions).
107. Public choice theorists have questioned the premise of a "public" interest. See supra
note 32 (discussing public choice theory).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 135-36 (discussing link between conflicts of inter-
est and lack of functionalist purpose).
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of authority to survive constitutional scrutiny, it must first respond to the need
for innovation - the reallocation must genuinely serve a functionalist purpose.
Second, the reallocation must not reflect a serious conflict of interest for
Congress when it enacted the reallocating legislation - the reallocation must
serve the functionalist purpose within reasonable bounds. Thus, courts should
sometimes invalidate a reallocation of authority because it does not really
serve a needed purpose and at other times invalidate it because the realloca-
tion entails a problematic conflict of interest (or because the legislation fails
both tests). In fact, this approach is implicit in much of the Supreme Court's
separation of powers case law. As the subsequent subparts indicate, one can
generally understand the Court's separation of powers decisions in terms of
a functionalist approach limited by conflicts of interest concems.' °9
109. Thus, although commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for incoherency in
its separation of powers cases, see Brown, supra note 97, at 1517-19 (describing Court's separa-
tion of powers jurisprudence as "an incoherent muddle"), the decisions make a good deal of
sense when considered from the perspective of responding to conflicts of interest concerns.
I am not arguing for functionalism limited by conflicts of interests considerations only on
the ground that it can explain Supreme Court doctrine. I would make my argument even if it
did not fit with past decisions by the Court. Nevertheless, I believe it helpful that a conflicts
of interest perspective fits well with the Court's jurisprudence.
Paul Verkuil has argued previously that conflicts of interest concerns should drive
separation of powers analysis, but he worries primarily about the possibility that government
officials will face a conflict of interest when they make particular decisions implementing a law.
See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 313, 315, 320-21 (observing that legislative veto allows campaign
contributions to influence members of Congress when asked to cast veto, that balanced budget
law at issue in Bowsher v. Synar would have subjected Comptroller General to legislative con-
trol when exercising executive authority, and that delegations of legislative power to executive
branch are problematic when President's discretion under statute is not sufficiently cabined to
prevent biased decision making).
I see my discussion of conflicts as stronger than Verkuil's in two ways. First, I take a
broader view of conflicts of interest, looking not only at how they influence government
officials implementing the law, but also at how they influence Congress in passing laws.
Second, I do not suggest that conflicts concerns alone explain separation of powers theory.
Rather, taking account of conflicts gives us a limiting principle for functionalist analysis. This
second difference responds to some of the leading critiques of Verkuil's approach. Other
scholars have observed that Verkuil tries to apply a single principle to separation of powers
questions when multiple concerns are at work. See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of
Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343, 344 (1989) (criticizing Verkuil's approach);
Redish & Cisar, supra note 5, at 500 (same).
Ronald Krotoszynski illustrated the conflicts of interest problems that can arise in the
implementation of federal statutes. He observed that some federal judges have created at least
an appearance of impropriety with their participation on the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion and their administration of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hals: Mistrctta and Mor-
rison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 419-21 (1997) (criticizing judges who served as
sentencing commissioners for not recusing themselves from challenges to Commission's work
and criticizing judges for ex parte contacts when appointing independent prosecutors).
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a. Invalidations for Lack of a Genuine Functionalist Justification
In some cases in which the Court has found a separation of powers
problem, one can explain the decision as a failure of the invalidated legislation
to serve a truly functional role. Although the Court typically uses formalist
reasoning to explain its result, the same conclusion results through functional-
ist analysis. Indeed, the Court's jurisprudence in this area makes sense by
observing that when legislation serves a real governmental need, and does not
raise conflicts of interest problems, the Court will use functionalist analysis
to uphold the statute. Conversely, when no genuine functional purpose is
served, the Court will override the statute, using formalist analysis.
Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar." ° As
discussed above,' the Bowsher Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings balanced budget act on formalist grounds. The Act authorized the
Comptroller General to specify spending reductions in the event that Congress
exceeded its budget targets under the Act." 2 Thus, the Comptroller General
was given some authority to execute the balanced budget act. However, the
Comptroller General is a member of the legislative branch and, according to
the Court, under the Constitution's division of power Congress may not exer-
cise control over a government official that has responsibilities for executing
the law." 3
The Court's reasoning is perfectly fine on its own, but it is incomplete
when considered with other separation of powers decisions. If the Constitu-
tion does not permit members of the legislative branch to engage in executive
action, it also should not permit members of the executive branch to engage
in legislative action. Yet the Court has generally upheld the authority of ad-
ministrative agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency or the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration to engage in rulemaking that is
effectively legislative in nature." 4 In such cases, the Court has recognized the
110. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45 (discussing Bowsher).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45 (discussing Bowsher).
112. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,717-18 (1986) (describing act).
113. See id. at 726 (discussing rationale for decision).
114. See STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 365 (describing lawmaking character of much
executive action). Typically, the Supreme Court will say that the rulemaking of an administra-
tive agency constitutes the execution of existing law rather than the legislation of new law. See,
e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (discussing distinc-
tion "between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law") (internal quotations omitted). However, at other
times, the Court will acknowledge that Congress has transferred legislative power to the
executive branch. See, e.g., United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul. & Pac. R.R. Co., 282
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need in the modem state for administrative agencies that the original constitu-
tional framework did not describe and that violate a strict, formalist theory of
the separation of powers. Accordingly, a complete opinion in Bowsher would
have explained why the particular reallocation of power involved was not
acceptable when other reallocations were.
And for such an explanation, one can point to the absence of any real
need for the Comptroller General to specify budget cuts. Although a modem
industrialized nation would have difficulty functioning if administrative
agencies did not enjoy lawmaking power, nothing about contemporary reali-
ties makes it infeasible for national legislatures to spend within their coun-
tries' means. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was an abdication of legisla-
tive authority, reflecting a lack of congressional will to make tough cuts in the
budget, not an unavoidable reallocation of authority reflecting the necessities
of the modem state. As discussed in the next subpart, conflicts of interest
analysis also can explain the Bowsher decision.
Clinton v. City ofNew York,' " 5 the line item veto case," 6 involved legisla-
tion that entailed an abdication of legislative authority rather than a recogni-
tion of modem complexities. According to the Court, a line item veto is
unconstitutional because Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides only
for complete vetoes of bills, not partial vetoes."' Instead of this formalist
argument, the Court could have observed that a line item veto does not serve
a genuine functionalist purpose. The line item veto is not designed to respond
to modem complexities but to let Congress avoid responsibility for budgetary
constraints. If a line item veto exists, members of Congress can continue to
fill their bills with pork barrel projects and rely on the President to excise the
pieces of pork that are unaffordable or otherwise undesirable for the country.
Clinton is like Bowsher not only in terms of failing to reflect a legitimate
functional need; it is also like Bowsher in raising conflicts of interest prob-
lems, as discussed in the next subpart of this Article.
A comparison between two of the Court's decisions on judicial authority
also illustrates the requirement that reallocations of authority must serve a
genuine governmental need. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
U.S. 311,324 (1931) (observing that Congress "cannot delegate any part of its legislative power
except under the limitation of a prescribed standard").
115. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
116. With a line item veto, the President can veto specific items in a bill and allow the
remainder of the bill to take effect, rather than having to choose between vetoing the entire bill
or permitting it to take effect. See id. at 438-39 (distinguishing line item veto from Article I,
§ 7 "return" of bill).
117. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,438-40 (1998) (finding that line item
veto violates procedure of Article I, Section 7).
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thon Pipe Line Co.,"' the Supreme Court held Section 241(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional because the Act created bankruptcy courts
with judges that lacked the essential rights and privileges of federal court
judges.119 On the other hand, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,2° the Court permitted Congress to grant jurisdiction over certain state
law claims to administrative law judges, even though such judges do not enjoy
the same rights and privileges as federal court judges.'' In Schor, the statute
in question allowed administrative law judges to decide matters of state law
that arose as counterclaims in regulatory proceedings before the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).' "
One can understand the Northern Pipeline decision on the ground that
Congress had no real need to relegate federal bankruptcy judges to second-
class status because having less privileged judges would not facilitate the
resolution of bankruptcy disputes." At the same time, one can understand the
Schor decision in terms of the important benefits that result from allowing the
resolution of state law counterclaims in the CFTC's regulatory proceedings.
By permitting administrative law judges to decide commodity futures trading
issues, Congress created a "'prompt,... expert and inexpensive method for
dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to exami-
nation and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to
that task."" 24 Preventing the CFTC from addressing all of the legal matters
relevant to its regulation of commodity futures trading would have compro-
mised that valuable purpose.
In short, consistent with this Article's suggested approach to separation
of powers concerns and the Supreme Court's separation of powers decisions,
the Court will reject a reallocation of national power if it clearly does not
serve a genuine governmental need. If the reallocation appears to serve a
genuine governmental need, the Court may uphold it, but there is still a second
step of the analysis. To uphold the reallocation of authority, a court must
conclude that a conflict of interest did not significantly influence Congress
when it enacted the reallocation. This second step is important, both because
118. 458 U.S. 50(1982).
119. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). The
bankruptcy court judges received fixed-term appointments under the Act, rather than lifetime
appointments, and received no protection from decreases in their salaries. Id. at 56-59.
120. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
121. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,847-57 (1986).
122. Id. at 835-36.
123. In other words, the relegation of such judges to second-class status did not serve the
goal of creating a group of judges with special expertise in bankruptcy law.
124. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,46 (1932)).
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it will not always be clear whether the reallocation genuinely serves a legiti-
mate need of government, and because the harms to the balance of power
among the three branches of government may outweigh the benefits to govern-
ment efficiency. In other words, concerns about conflicts of interest provide
a limiting principle for finctionalism. Indeed, as this Article has suggested,
the Court's separation of powers decisions implicitly incorporate this role for
conflicts of interest analysis. The next subpart elaborates on this point.
b. Invalidations Because of Concerns About Conflicts of Interest
In its separation of powers decisions, the Court has been troubled when
Congress appears to act out of a conflict of interest. More specifically, the
Court dislikes attempts by Congress to seize power from another branch of the
national government or from future Congresses. When Congress tries to seize
authority, thereby aggrandizing its power," s the Court worries that Congress's
motivation is not so much the public good as its own self-interest. Con-
versely, when Congress yields power to another branch of government, it is
more likely that interests of the country motivated it to do so. 2 Accordingly,
the Court has shown little concern in the past sixty years with legislative
delegations of authority to administrative agencies or independent commis-
sions of the national government.12
Several cases illustrate the unacceptability of congressional seizures of
power. For example, in Myers v. United States,121 the Supreme Court rejected
an attempt by Congress to require Senate approval before the President could
fire an official in the executive branch.1 29 Similarly, in Bowsher v. Synar, the
balanced budget case, Congress tried to seize power in two ways - first by
125. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (discussing "concern of
encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence");
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (observing that separation of powers doctrine aims
to prevent "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other");
see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
Cm. L. REV. 123, 161-65 (1994) (discussing "no congressional aggrandizement" theory); Peter
L. Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions -A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 519-21 (1987) (criticizing Bowsher Court's narrow
concept of aggrandizement).
126. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 421 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that,
because congressional delegation of lawmaking power increases power of coordinate branch
of national government, "the need for delegation would have to be important enough to induce
Congress to aggrandize its primary competitor for political power").
127. See STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 366 (discussing demise of nondelegation doctrine).
128. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
129. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). In Myers, the statute at issue re-
quired Senate approval before the President could remove a postmaster from office. Id. at 107.
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exercising control over a government officer with executive authority, 3° and
second by transferring power to itself from future Congresses."' With respect
to the latter method, if legislation requires balanced budgets (or limited defi-
cits) in future years, and such legislation has effect, then Congresses in future
years no longer can exercise their full legislative authority.'32
Like the balanced budget act, the line item veto also suffered from a
congressional attempt to seize power from future Congresses. As the Court
observed in Clinton v. City of New York, it is permissible for Congress to give
the President permission in a particular piece of legislation to implement all
or only part of the legislation.'33 However, it is not permissible for Congress,
in one bill, to give the President authority to implement all or part of every
future bill.134
Note, as mentioned previously, 135 that the cases show a correlation
between a conflict of interest and the lack of a genuine functional purpose for
a law. In Bowsher and Clinton, the legislation was problematic because of
Congress's conflict of interest and because the legislation served no real need.
This is exactly what we would expect from conflicts of interest. When
Congress serves its own interests, it is less likely to serve the public interest.
Similar correlations result from the use of procedural standards elsewhere in
constitutional analysis. Laws that are suspect under an Elyian representation-
reinforcement analysis'36 because of their effect on the political process also
130. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718 (1986). The balanced budget act at issue gave
the Comptroller General, an official in the legislative branch, authority to make cuts in the
national budget, an activity entailing execution of the law. See supra notes 112-13 and accom-
panying text (discussing Bowsher).
131. The Court did not cite this problem with the balanced budget act, although other
scholars have done so. STONE ET AL., supra note 36, at 455.
132. Another way of characterizing a balanced budget act, then, is an attempt to amend the
Constitution by a majority vote of Congress. Id.
133. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-46 (1998) (discussing cases
approving discretion granted by Congress to President in execution of certain laws).
134. This distinction between giving the President power to implement all or part of one
law and giving the President power to implement all or part of all future laws explains why the
line item veto is not merely a transfer of power from Congress to the President. When a current
Congress seizes power from future Congresses, it is aggrandizing its own power, even if it is
not doing so at the expense of a coordinate branch of government. Any aggrandizement of
power raises concerns that self-interest is behind the aggrandizement. In other words, we
should worry about conflicts of interest even when they do not change the balance of power
among the three branches of the national government. Indeed, one of the virtues of a conflicts
analysis is its ability to identify problems that other theoretical frameworks might miss.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17 (discussing Bowsher v. Synar and Clinton
v. City of New York).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90 (discussing Ely's representation-reinforce-
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are suspect because it is difficult to identify a legitimate public purpose for
such laws. For example, poll taxes are unconstitutional under a represen-
tation-reinforcement analysis because they impede participation by indigent
persons in the political process. At the same time, poll taxes are problematic
because their primary purpose is a discriminatory one - to prevent some
classes of citizens from voting.
While some reallocations of authority may be problematic both because
they fail to serve a genuine governmental need and because they grow out of
a congressional conflict of interest, other reallocations will be problematic
only on conflict of interest grounds. For example, when Congress required its
approval before the President could fire an executive officer, as in the Myers
case,'37 Congress could have defended its action on the ground that the func-
tioning of the government would improve if the President could not fire public
officials at will. The problem with the statute in Myers was its transfer of
authority from the President to Congress.
c. When Does a Conflict of Interest Become Problematic?
This Article has drawn an obvious distinction between Congress giving
up authority to another branch of the national government and Congress
seizing power from another branch of the national government. But what if
Congress tries to diminish the authority of another branch of the national
government without increasing its own power? In a number of cases, Con-
gress insulated government officials with executive power from presidential
oversight but did not try to substitute its own oversight. For example, Con-
gress prohibited the President from firing an independent counsel without
cause,13 even though the President ordinarily can fire a federal prosecutor
without cause. Similarly, Congress has created independent commissions, like
the Federal Trade Commission, and allowed removal of commissioners from
office only for cause, even though executive branch officials ordinarily serve
at the pleasure of the President.'39 Do such cases not give rise to conflict of
interest concerns because Congress does not seize power? Or should one
worry, because Congress increases its power relative to another branch of
government when it diminishes the authority of that branch? In other words,
ment approach).
137. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing Myers).
138. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988) (upholding "good cause" re-
moval requirement).
139. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,621-32 (1935) (discussing
constitutionality of statutory restrictions on President's removal power over Federal Trade
Commissioners).
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are relative increases in power as valuable to Congress as absolute increases
in power?
In general, the Court is correct on conflicts of interest grounds when it
permits Congress to insulate government officials from termination without
cause. Congress may have as much to lose as it has to gain when it protects
Federal Trade Commissioners or Federal Communications Commissioners
from peremptory removal from office. It is true that an independent commis-
sioner can side more easily with Congress when Congress and the President
disagree. At the same time, however, Congress cannot influence the President
to fire an independent commissioner who has fallen into disfavor with Con-
gress. When a public official serves at the pleasure of the President, Congress
may seek the official's dismissal while engaged in its usual bargaining with
the President over proposed legislation. In short, because independent com-
missions do not necessarily increase the relative power of Congress, it is
reasonable to assume that when Congress creates independent commissions,
it is motivated by the benefits that the independence of commissions creates
for the country.
Moreover, it may not be accurate for another reason to characterize
the creation of independent commissions as giving Congress a relative in-
crease in power. When Congress creates independent commissions, it must
delegate some of its power to the commissions. When comparing the status
quo before the creation of an independent commission with the state of affairs
after its creation, Congress probably diminishes its power more than it dim-
inishes executive power. In other words, the relevant comparison may not
be between an independent commission and an administrative agency sub-
ject to presidential control, but between an independent commission and no
commission.
Although the Court seems to be correct in allowing independent com-
missions, one might come to a different conclusion on occasion, as in the
case of the independent counsel law. Dissatisfaction with the independent
counsel during the Clinton administration illustrates the risk of allowing
Congress to insulate all executive branch officials from presidential oversight.
An independent counsel can become an attack dog on the President as well as
a guardian of the public interest.14 It may be unclear whether Congress
supports an independent counsel law for good or for bad reasons. Accord-
ingly, a strong conflicts of interest approach might disallow an independent
140. Justice Scalia's dissent inMorrison v. Olon emphasized concerns about an independ-
ent counsel harrasing the President. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712-13, 727-34 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing intimidation of presidential advisors, erosion of public support, and
lack of political check on independent counsel).
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counsel law,14' while a less aggressive conflicts approach would allow such
a law.
INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, also is a close call under con-
flicts of interest analysis. 42 On one hand, it appears that Congress tried to
seize power from the executive branch. By wielding a legislative veto, the
House or Senate could act as a super-executive, reviewing the actions of the
executive branch and stepping in at times of disagreement. On the other hand,
as Justice White's dissent in Chadha suggested, Congress may have tried only
to limit the amount of legislative power it delegated to the executive branch
when it passed acts that included a legislative veto.'43 If one views the legisla-
tive veto as part of a larger piece of legislation rather than by itself, it entails
a diminution in authority relinquished by Congress and not a seizure of
authority by Congress.4
Just as a legislative veto is a close call on conflicts grounds, it is also a
close call whether the legislative veto served a genuine functionalist purpose.
On one hand, a legislative veto may be an innovative way for Congress to
draw a balance between delegating legislative power to administrative agen-
cies and maintaining adequate control over its legislative power. On the other
hand, Harold Bruff and Walter Gellhorn have argued that rather than improv-
ing the function of the national government, the legislative veto may have
made it easier for special interests to dominate the political process. 4 Special
interests could use their lobbying tactics more effectively to achieve a legisla-
tive veto than to influence decisions by an administrative agency or to push
legislation through both houses of Congress.'46
Although consideration of conflicts leaves some uncertainty, it does
much to curtail the openendedness of current functionalist analysis. One can
141. In the absence of an independent counsel, Presidents and other officials are not im-
mune from prosecution. Congress may impeach executive branch officials that act improperly.
See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 327 (citing In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 506-507 (D.C. Cir.
1988), for point that Constitution deals with possibility of executive branch wrongdoing
exclusively through impeachment process).
142. See supra notes 47-49 (discussing Chadha).
143. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
144. Note in this regard an important distinction between the legislative veto and the line
item veto. Congress enacted the line item veto in one bill and applied it to all future spending
bills. Congress thus tried to bind all future Congresses. Conversely, Congress included the
legislative veto in each bill to which it would apply.
145. See Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Cellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study ofLegislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369,1413 (1977) (observing that
legislative vetoes allowed special interest groups to affect policy outside public rulemaking
procedures).
146. Id.
744
CONFLICTS OF IVTEREST AND THE CONSTITUTION
assess the seriousness of a conflict of interest more readily than one can
measure the effect of a reallocation of national authority on the balance of
power among Congress, the President, and the courts. Indeed, judging degrees
of severity is a common exercise with regard to conflicts of interest elsewhere
in the law and in other fields. For example, rules of professional responsibil-
ity distinguish conflicts of interest involving current clients from conflicts
involving former clients. 147 Similarly, the federal government's regulations
for scientists conducting human research distinguish financial interests in the
outcome of such research that exceed $50,000 from those that do not exceed
$50,000.'" In short, the addition of conflicts considerations to the functional-
ist approach for separation of powers cases substantially strengthens function-
alist theory.
The next subpart analyzes a second way in which consideration of con-
flicts of interest can clarify constitutional interpretation. Consideration of
conflicts not only can strengthen functionalist separation of powers theory, but
also it can reconcile the political question doctrine with the principle of
judicial supremacy.
B. The Political Question Doctrine, Judicial Supremacy, and
Conflicts of Interest
According to the political question doctrine, some constitutional questions
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive and legislative branches,
the politically accountable branches of government. If someone challenges
executive or legislative action on a political question, federal courts must
refrain from deciding the challenge. 49
1. Problems with the Current Political Question Theory
Under the usual analysis, the political question doctrine is quite elusive.
As Martin Redish observed, "[t]he doctrine has always proven to be an enigma
to commentators... [who have] disagreed about its wisdom and validity...
[and] have also differed significantly over the doctrine's scope and ration-
ale. 1' 0 Louis Henkin argued that when the Supreme Court upholds legislative
or executive action on political question grounds, it does nothing more than say
147. See MODEL RULEs PROF'L CONDuCT Rs. 1.7, 1.9 (2002) (forbidding representation
if it involves concurrent conflict of interest and describing duties to former clients).
148. 21 C.F.R. §§ 54.2(b), 54.4(aX3Xiv) (2001).
149. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 127-28 (discussing political question doctrine).
150. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031, 1031 (1985).
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that no constitutional violation occurred."' In Henkin's view, courts should
characterize political question cases as decisions on the merits because that is
what they are in fact.' 2 A number of cases in which the courts should exercise
substantial deference to presidential or congressional action when deciding on
the merits may exist. For example, on some matters, like the conduct of foreign
policy, the President may need broad discretionary authority. Still, courts can
grant broad deference without abandoning judicial review altogether. 53
These critiques of the political question doctrine are what one might have
expected. The idea of such a doctrine seems inconsistent with Marbury v.
Madison's recognition of judicial supremacy on matters of constitutional
interpretation.5 4 Indeed, the political question doctrine creates a real tension
with the principle of judicial supremacy. If the Marbury Court is correct that
courts should have the final say on constitutional questions, then it is problem-
atic to have courts also invoke a doctrine that precludes judges from hearing
some constitutional questions.
Given the tension between Marbury and the political question doctrine,
it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has offered unpersuasive justifica-
tions for the political question doctrine. The Court announced its modem
political question doctrine in 1962 in Baker v. Carr,'55 a case challenging
Tennessee's failure to reapportion its legislative districts." In Baker, the
Court listed several indicia of a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
151. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597,597-601
(1976).
152. Id. at 601. In some cases, the Court might conclude that, even though justiciable, a
constitutional claim might fail due to the Court's inability to respond to a request for an equita-
ble remedy. Id. at 617-22.
153. See Redish, supra note 150, at 1051 (proposing that courts could vary level of defer-
ence given depending on severity of particular emergency and loss of liberty involved).
154. See Fritz W. ScharpfJudicialRevew and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnal-
ysis, 7 5 YALE L.J. 517, 518 (1966) (noting that if courts are free to disregard their judicial duties
by treating political questions as determinative of some questions of law, this would destroy
notion of judicial supremacy). To be sure, the Marbury Court reserved some constitutional
questions for the political branches of the federal government. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803). Nevertheless, one still must explain why and when there are
exceptions to the principle ofjudicial supremacy.
155. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
156. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-91 (1962).
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resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
ofgovernment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a polit-
ical decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.1
57
Yet none of these standards gives much guidance. The standard of "a
textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department," for example, yields either an empty set of political questions or
too large a set. If textually committed means an explicit statement in the
Constitution that recognizes executive or legislative authority to interpret the
particular provision, then no provision meets that definition. On the other
hand, if textually committed means that the courts cannot intervene when the
Constitution expressly grants a governmental power to the executive or
legislative branch, the judicial branch would not be able to decide Commerce
Clause claims and many other claims that courts regularly decide.!"8
The other Baker standards are similarly unhelpful. For example, any
time the Court overturns an executive or legislative action, it in some sense
expresses a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government. The Baker
standard speaks of a lack of "due" respect, but when exactly would judicial
intervention cross the line from due to undue respect? As to deciding whether
a policy determination is "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," that
standard is circular, a restatement of the inquiry. The issue for the political
question doctrine is when executive or legislative action is beyond the reach
of the courts.
Some scholars have focused on particular issues as demanding judicial
abstention. For example, some suggest that matters of foreign policy are
especially inappropriate for judicial resolution. In this regard, Theodore
Blumoff argued that courts should accept review only when Congress and the
President cannot agree about the policy at stake.159 And, in fact, a number of
political question cases have involved foreign policy. The Supreme Court has
left to Congress the determination of when a war ends.1" Likewise, lower
federal courts often have invoked the political question doctrine to dismiss
157. Id. at217.
158. According to the Commerce Clause, "Congress shall have Power... to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Moreover, "faill legislative Powers... shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States...." U.S. CONST. art. L, § 1.
159. Theodore Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs, and Legislative Standing, 25
OA. L. REv. 227,233-35 (1991).
160. See Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) ("A court cannot estimate
the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination at a particular moment of time .... ").
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challenges to the President's exercise of the war powers."' Yet at other times
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have entertained cases involv-
ing the exercise of the war powers or other foreign policy actions. In Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,62 the Court intervened when President
Truman tried to take possession of and operate most of the steel mills in the
United States to prevent a nationwide steelworkers strike during the Korean
War. 63 Similarly, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,"6 the Court upheld on the
merits the President's termination of court claims by U.S. nationals against
Iran and his transfer of the claims to a special Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal.6 ' The lower courts have decided in several cases whether the
United States was "at war" within the meaning of the Constitution or instead
engaged in military action of another kind."6 Moreover, judicial abstention
from matters of foreign policy creates real problems. Rather than reflecting
a sensitive regard for the prerogatives of a coordinate branch of government,
judicial abstention entails an erosion of one of the important checks and
balances in our constitutional system 67 and undermines individual protec-
tion from the excesses of the majority or those of overreaching government
officials.
One might have special concerns about judicial intervention when a
plaintiff challenges the waging of a war. If courts could force the President
to recall troops sent abroad, the judiciary might compromise national security.
Nevertheless, this argument is not sufficient for judicial abstention. It is
difficult to imagine that courts would interfere with a just war, and the courts
161. See, e.g., Sarnoffv. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 929 (1972) (declining on political question grounds to hear challenge to President's
authority to wage war in Vietnam without congressional declaration of war); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) (invoking political
question doctrine in response to claim that United States' participation in Vietnam was unlawful
because Congress had not made formal declaration of war).
162. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
163. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-84 (1952).
164. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
165. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,686 (1981).
166. See, e.g., Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042-43 (observing that political question doctrine does
not preclude judicial scrutiny to determine whether Congress has satisfied constitutional
requirement of joint participation with President in prosecution of war even though political
question doctrine leaves to Congress power to decide how it signals its consent to presidential
waging of war); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260,264 (10th Cir. 1946) (hold-
ing that, for purposes of life insurance policy, United States was at war once Japan attacked
Pearl Harbor).
167. See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign
Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1179 (1970) (concluding that judicial abdication erodes
"formal structural guarantees" of Constitution).
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need to be available to interfere with an unjust war. When courts are too
deferential to claims of national security, infamous decisions like Korematsu
v. United States'" result.
Undoubtedly, courts should turn away some challenges to foreign policy
decisions. But courts can do so by holding that Presidents or Congresses acted
within their constitutional discretion. There is no need to abdicate responsi-
bility by invoking a political question doctrine. Holding that Presidents or
Congresses acted within their authority, rather than declining to decide the
case, also is a good approach for other issues that might fall under the political
question doctrine. In other words, Henkin largely was persuasive when he
argued that political question decisions really should be decisions on the
merits in which the courts conclude that Presidents or Congresses acted within
their legitimate discretion. 69
2. Conflicts of Interest and Political Question Theory
There is nevertheless one area in which it makes sense for courts to yield
authority to the executive or legislative branch. In some cases it would be
unwise for courts to take jurisdiction. Specifically, courts should find a polit-
ical question when their involvement would entail a serious institutional
conflict of interest for the judiciary. The presence of such a conflict signals
that a judge ought not decide an issue, but instead should leave the issue to the
discretion of the executive or legislative branch. 7' If courts overrode an exec-
utive or legislative decision in the face of a conflict of interest, they would
invite questions about the legitimacy of the override. The public would sus-
pect that the court's institutional interest, rather than an impartial interpreta-
tion of the law, drove the court's decision.'71
168. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In KorematLu, the Court upheld
the internment during World War II of all persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West
Coast, even though there was strong reason at the time of the case to doubt the existence of
military necessity for the internment. See MunPHY ET A,., supra note 94, at 88-89 (discussing
political and economic factors motivating Court to uphold internment of persons of Japanese
ancestry in Korematsu).
169. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing Henkin's view).
170. The other branches also would face conflicts if left to decide the constitutionality of
their actions. Nevertheless, that conflict is not adequately addressed by bringing in another
decision maker that is also hampered by a conflict of interest but is less accountable to the public
(by virtue of having a lifetime appointment). I elaborate on this point infra notes 193-96 and
accompanying text.
171. This concern arose regarding Justice O'Connor's vote in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), the decision that closed off Vice President Gore's legal challenges to the Florida vote
count in the 2000 presidential election. When Newsweek reported that Justice O'Connor ex-
pressed dismay to friends on election night about a Gore victory because of a desire to resign
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The case ofNixon v. United States'12 illustrates this point well. Congress
impeached Walter Nixon, a district court judge in Mississippi, and convicted
him for committing perjury." He lied to a grand jury investigating charges
that he had accepted a bribe to halt a prosecution."7 4 Nixon sought judicial
review of his conviction on the ground that the Senate did not properly try him
under the impeachment clause in Article I of the Constitution. According to
Article I, the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,"'75
and Nixon objected to the use of a Senate committee rather than the full
Senate to consider his impeachment.'76 The Supreme Court rejected the chal-
lenge on political question grounds, concluding in part that there were no
judicially manageable standards for deciding what the word "try" means in the
impeachment clause."' The Court's logic is difficult to accept when it
reasons that courts cannot figure out what it means to try a case. Indeed,
judges have special expertise in understanding what it means to try a case.
Moreover, it is difficult to square the Nixon case with Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 7 an earlier case in which the Court entertained Adam Clayton
Powell's challenge to a House resolution that barred him from taking his seat
in Congress."7 In the Powell case; the Court interpreted Article I, Section 5,
Clause 1, which states that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members .... ,'S If the Court cannot
during the next administration and to have a Republican president choose her successor, people
wondered whether Justice O'Connor's personal preferences drove her decision. See Joan Bis-
kupic, Election Still Splits Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2001, at IA (discussing fallout over
Justice O'Connor's alleged election night statements); see also Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff,
The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at 46 (reporting Justice O'Connor's
reaction to Gore victory).
172. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
173. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,226 (1993).
174. Id. at 226.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
176. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227-28.
177. Id. at 228-30. The Court also based its decision on other considerations, including
the fact that the Senate has the "sole" power to try impeachments and the concern that judicial
involvement in impeachments of judges would compromise the ability of Congress to check
abuses by the judicial branch. Id. at 229-35. This latter concern of the Nixon Court ties into
conflicts of interest concerns in a second way - the propriety of the Court passing judgment on
another member of the judiciary.
178. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
179. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,489 (1969).
180. The Court overrode the House's denial of Rep. Powell's seat. Id. at 547-48. The
denial resulted from allegations that he illegally used official funds. Id. The Court concluded
that the House could decide only whether a member satisfied the constitutional requirements
of age, citizenship, and residency under Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Id.
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second guess a conviction by the Senate, it seemingly would follow that the
Court ought not to second guess a judgment by the House of a member's
qualifications.
From a conflicts of interest perspective, however, one can understand the
Nixon decision on its own and why it came out differently than the Powell
case. In Nixon, the Court would have reviewed the impeachment and convic-
tion of a federal judge, and a reversal of the conviction would have raised
questions as to whether the Justices acted simply to protect a judicial col-
league."' With Powell, on the other hand, no such conflict of interest existed.
When the Court overrode the House of Representatives, there was no reason
for the public to suspect that ulterior motives were at work.
Coleman v. Millera' also illustrates the role of conflicts of interest in
political question analysis. In Coleman, the Court held it to be a political
question whether three-fourths ofthe states ratified a constitutional amendment
within a reasonable amount of time. The Court concluded that no judicially
manageable standards were discernable for deciding what constituted a reason-
able amount of time. 84 However, the Court's logic was weak. Courts often
construe standards of reasonableness. Indeed, an earlier decision by the Court
undermines its argument in Coleman. Although Article V does not mention
time limits for constitutional amendments, the Court in Dillon v. Gloss"5
considered whether Congress could set a time limit for ratification when it
proposed an amendment."8 6 In recognizing such authority, the Court under-
stood the amendment process to envision a reasonable time between proposal
and ratification and stated that the two steps "are not to be widely separated in
time" but are to be "a single endeavor."'" The Coleman Court was correct to
deny jurisdiction, but it should have abstained on conflicts of interest grounds.
Since the amendment process is the chief way by which the public can check
decisions by the Supreme Court, the Court faces a serious conflict of interest
in interpreting the procedures for amendment described in Article V.'8"
181. The Court in fact recognized this problem. See supra note 177 (discussing Nixon).
182. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
183. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,453-54,456 (1939).
184. Id. at 452-56.
185. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
186. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,371 (1921).
187. Id. at 374-75.
188. See Scharpf, supra note 154, at 589 (distinguishing case in which Court strikes down
law as incompatible with its choice of constitutional values and case in which Court could, by
narrow interpretation of amendment procedures, prevent ratification of amendment intended to
overrule one of its previous decisions), cited in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 n.2
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also CHEMERINsKY, supra note 6, at 131 (discussing
defense of political question doctrine on ground that "courts' self-interest disqualified them
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Not only does the presence of a conflict of interest provide a good reason
for judicial abstention, it provides ajustification that fits well withMarbury v.
Madison. Recall that the political question doctrine currently creates tension
with the judicial supremacy principle of Marbury.5 9 If courts are the final
arbiters of constitutional questions, then it is not a good idea for courts to
abstain from deciding those questions. Such abstention effectively constitutes
an abdication of judicial authority. If instead judicial abstention rests on
concerns about conflicts of interest, then the political question doctrine
becomes consistent with Marbury. When courts face a conflict of interest by
asserting their Marbury authority, the case for judicial supremacy is much
weaker than in the ordinary case. One should be reluctant to permit judicial
overrides of the political process when the courts may not be reliable decision
makers.
Note that concerns about conflicts of interest also provide an important
justification for the Marbury principle of judicial supremacy. As other schol-
ars have indicated, it is important to have judicial review of federal legislation
because the alternative is for Congress to have the authority both to pass laws
and to decide their constitutionality. 190 In other words, the alternative is to put
Congress in a hopelessly conflicted position. Congress could not make its
constitutional judgments with the neutrality and objectivity required. Even if
Congress could separate its legislative judgment from its constitutional
judgment, it would be difficult for the public to trust congressional judgments
upholding the constitutionality of legislation that raised serious constitutional
questions. Similarly, the judiciary must be able to decide the constitutionality
of executive action, for otherwise the President would have authority both to
act and to decide the constitutionality of the action. Taking account of con-
flicts of interest explains both the need for judicial supremacy and when
judicial supremacy is no longer appropriate.
Although consideration of conflicts of interest helps one to understand
Marbury and the political question doctrine, it also points to another conflicts
problem. Even with a political question doctrine based on conflicts of interest
from ruling on certain matters").
Walter Dellinger argues that few constitutional amendments have been passed to override
the Supreme Court, see Walter Dellinger, TheLegitimacyofConstitutional Change: Rethinking
the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 414-15 (1983), but that does not change the
fact that the amendment process is the chief check on the Supreme Court.
189. See supra text accompanying note 154 (discussing tension created).
190. See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-35,49 U. Cm. L. REV. 646, 657 (1982) (characterizing judicial supremacy as way
to avoid proverbial situation of fox guarding chicken coop); LOCKE, supra note 26, at 293-94,
341-45, 369 (arguing that civil government requires impartial third party to decide controver-
sies).
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considerations, judicial abstention leaves a conflict of interest behind. If the
executive and legislative branches have authority in some cases to decide the
constitutionality of their actions, one must worry about their ability to make
unbiased constitutional assessments of those actions. Nevertheless, one can
conclude that the conflicts faced by Congress or the President are more
tolerable than substituting a judicial conflict for them. The legislative and
executive branches are more accountable to the voter than is the judiciary; the
ballot permits the public to express its disapproval of a governmental decision
more readily than the constitutional amendment process. Accordingly, the
public is in a better position to correct the effects of a conflict of interest
arising from congressional or presidential action than one arising from a
judicial decision. In other words, if it is not possible to eliminate conflicts of
interest in the branches of the national government, it is better if Congress and
the President face the conflicts than if the courts face them. 91
In short, by basing the political question doctrine on conflicts of interest
concerns, rather than on the considerations cited by the Court in Baker v.
Carr,'92 one ends up with a doctrine that not only provides much clearer
guidance to the courts but also that does not create tension with the principle
of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
3. Potential Concerns with Conflicts of Interest as a Basis for the
Political Question Doctrine
There are two potential concerns with this Article's conflicts of interest
analysis for the political question doctrine. First, one might question whether
courts facing conflicts of interest will properly take the conflicts into account
when reaching their decisions. Second, one might observe that courts decid-
ing the constitutionality of action by Congress or the President have their own
conflicts of interest at stake - courts can enhance their political power by
asserting their power to override.
As to whether conflicts analysis can serve as a check on a judge that is
the conflicted person, that should not be a serious problem. It is true that
people often act unthinkingly on the basis of conflicts of interest. The physi-
cian who recommends additional tests for a patient probably would explain
the recommendation in terms of the patient's best interests rather than in terms
of any financial gain that the physician would realize. from the testing. Never-
theless, one reasonably can expect courts to be responsive to conflicts con-
191. I do not suggest that the electoral process is sufficient to check all legislative or presi-
dential conflicts of interest. It clearly is not. Nevertheless, it remains that the public is in a bet-
ter position to check these conflicts of interest than it is to check judicial conflicts of interest.
192. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing Baker v,. Carr).
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cerns in their decision making. When a conflict of interest is involved, one of
the parties to the case would argue for judicial abstention because of the
conflict, and the court would have to explain why it accepted or rejected the
conflict argument. Conflicts of interest generally are problematic precisely
because they often operate without notice, but judges could not easily escape
public scrutiny of their institutional conflicts of interest. Moreover, the fact
that one can explain decisions like Nixon (involving the conviction of Judge
Nixon) and Coleman (regarding amendments to the Constitution) in terms of
conflicts of interest considerations suggests that courts will take those consid-
erations into account when deciding cases.
The second potential concern with this Article's argument - whether
courts themselves face a conflict of interest when deciding the constitutional-
ity of actions by Congress or the President - also is answerable. The concern
is not trivial. In Marbury, a desire to increase the authority of the judiciary
may have influenced the Supreme Court's thinking. If the Court has final
authority to interpret the Constitution, it enjoys power that the other branches
of the national government lack.
Yet the conflict of interest for the Court in asserting its oversight of
executive and legislative action does not raise the kinds of concerns that are
raised by Congress and the President detennining the constitutionality of their
actions. Indeed, one ordinarily does not worry very much about an independ-
ent government entity's self-interest when it has oversight authority over
another institution or organization. If there are concerns about police corrup-
tion, for example, the appointment of an independent commission responds
to potential conflicts of interest that might compromise internal police investi-
gations, and one generally trusts the independent commission's findings
despite the possibility that it has its own interests at stake. For example, the
commission may be driven to find problems with police practices to justify its
efforts. Similarly, although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
can increase its authority by penalizing corporations for violations of the law,
that conflict of interest is much less discomforting than leaving companies
unregulated and able to abuse their power. It is difficult to imagine that the
harms of a more aggressive SEC could ever equal the harms caused by the
ability of energy-trading giant Enron and its accounting firm, Arthur An-
dersen, to operate under their own interpretations of what practices werelegitimate. 193
193. In December 2001, the Enron Corporation filed what was then the largest corporate
bankruptcy ever in the United States. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron
Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al (giving
overview of Enron collapse). Allegations of wrongful behavior targeted not only Enron but also
Arthur Andersen. See Alex Berenson & Jonathan D. Olater, A TatteredAndersen Fights for Its
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When an independent body has oversight authority, the main concern is
not that society substitutes one conflict of interest for another. Rather, the
primary concern is that we avoid a serious conflict of interest by sacrificing
expertise. If non-physicians judge misconduct by physicians, for example,
one worries that the non-physicians will misunderstand the medical consider-
ations.
To be sure, concerns about conflicts of interest arise at times with inde-
pendent bodies. The independent counsel law for the investigation and prose-
cution of executive branch officials drew criticism in part because of concerns
that some of the counsel were overly zealous in their efforts to find wrongdo-
ing." According to this view, the independent counsel have an incentive to
bring charges to justify their time and effort. Moreover, some oversight bodies
can become too close to those whom they monitor. Lobbyists may wield
influential power over an administrative agency. An accounting firm may
ignore corporate misconduct to protect its auditing fees. But these conflicts of
interest problems are not likely to become serious with the federal courts.
In short, the conflict of interest faced by Congresses or Presidents in
deciding the constitutionality oftheir own actions is of greater concern than the
Supreme Court's review of the constitutionality of congressional or presi-
dential conduct. This point becomes clearer when one considers more closely
the conflicts involved. For Congress and the President, the conflict of interest
is most serious. They would be inclined to use a power to decide the constitu-
tionality of their action to enlarge their own power. They could interpret the
limits of their authority generously when contemplating new legislation, ad-
ministrative agency regulations, or executive orders. The President would
have a temptation to encroach upon legislative perogatives; Congress would
have a temptation to infringe upon executive authority.
In contrast, when the Supreme Court decides the constitutionality of con-
gressional or executive action, it need not act in a systematic way to change the
constitutional order. The Court can exercise its power either by approving or
invalidating the action of the other branch. Its authority comes from the ability
to decide, and that ability often will be independent of the direction of the
decision. Whether the Supreme Court ruled for George Bush or for Al Gore in
Bush v. Gore,'95 it would have played a pivotal role in deciding the 2000
presidential election. In other words, the Court can assert its authority either
by giving greater rein to the other branches of government or by constraining
Future, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2002, at § 3, at I (detailing Arthur Anderson's problems stemming
from its connection with Enron).
194. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Putting Law and Politics in the Right Places - Re-
forming the Independent Counsel Statute, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1999, at 163,170-
71 (discussing independent counsel law's effects on law enforcement).
195. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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their authority. The Court does not need to limit presidential or congressional
power in order to enhance its own power.
To be sure, one can argue that conflicts of interest will bias decisions by
the Supreme Court. If the Court too often upholds congressional or executive
action, the public will view the trend as a rubber stamp. Consequently, to
secure its authority, the Court sometimes must invalidate challenged actions.
But there is no reason that this minimal need to override Congress or the
President should have a strong effect on the Court. In fact, this argument takes
us back to the previous point about independent commissions with oversight
authority. Such commissions may have an institutional interest in finding
fault with the people whom they regulate, but acting out of that conflict of
interest does not raise nearly the concerns raised when people are left unregu-
lated.'
The next, and final, subpart discusses a third way in which taking account
of conflicts of interest can clarify constitutional interpretation. Conflicts
considerations can respond to the question of whether Article V provides the
exclusive means of amending the Constitution.
C. Amending the Constitution and Conflicts of Interest
While conflicts of interest in constitutional law are most pertinent to the
relationships among the three branches of the national government, their
relevance does not end there. Conflicts of interest can also affect relations
between individuals and the national government. Illustrative of this point is
the process of amending the Constitution and the question of whether Article
V provides the exclusive means for doing so.
Recall that the Constitution addresses the amendment process through
Article V, the relevant language of which follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
196. In addition, recall that Congress already enjoys an important check on the authority
of the judiciary to override legislative action. According to Article M of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in federal cases, "with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. 131, § 2, cl. 2. If courts become
too aggressive in their oversight of Congress, then Congress can limit judicial oversight In
other words, judicial supremacy does more to create a balance with congressional power over
the judiciary than it does to upset the balance.
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three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress .... '
Article V has two key parts. It describes: (1) the proposal of constitutional
amendments (either by Congress or by constitutional convention requested by
the state legislatures); and (2) the ratification of constitutional amendments
(either by state legislatures or by state constitutional conventions).
In recent years, an important debate as to whether Article V provides the
exclusive means of amending the Constitution has occurred. A number of
scholars have observed that while Article V indicates how the Constitution
may be amended, it does not provide that its methods of amendment are the
only permissible methods. 9 In other words, Article V describes sufficient
procedures for constitutional amendment, but its text does not speak in terms
of necessary procedures for amendment.'"
There are good reasons to think that alternative methods are available for
constitutional amendment. If one wants to argue from text, one can observe
that the Framers knew how to state that a provision has no exceptions. For
example, Article I, Section 7, Clause 1 makes it clear that only the House of
Representatives, and not the Senate, may initiate "Bills for raising Revenue. 2°°
Similarly, Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 makes it clear that the Senate must try
impeachments of federal officeholders.2"' Since Article V does not say that
only Congress or constitutional conventions may propose constitutional
amendments, it is not necessary to conclude that they alone have the power to
do so.212
197. U.S. CONST. art. V.
198. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457,459 (1994) (arguing that Congress would be obliged
to call convention to propose revisions to Constitution if majority of American voters so peti-
tioned and that amendment to Constitution could be lawfully ratified by simple majority of
American electorate); see also James W. Torke, Assessing the Ackerman and Amar Theses:
Notes on Extratextual Constitutional Change, 4 WID. J. PUB. L. 229 (1994) (discussing gener-
ally possibility of constitutional amendment outside of Article V).
199. Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONsTrrUTIONALAMNDMENT 63, 72 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
200. The clause states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, el. 1.
201. The clause states that "[tlhe Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
202. But see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and Consti-
tutional Amendment, 96 COLUM L. REV. 121, 131-32 (1996) (observing that constitutional
provisions can be exclusive even without "only" language); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1241-45, 1273-76 (1995) (same).
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The nature of our constitutional system also suggests a role for alternative
methods of constitutional amendment. The United States is fundamentally a
government of the people.2 3 One therefore would expect the Constitution to
permit alternative mechanisms for amendment when the mechanisms set out
in Article V would frustrate the public's ability to make legitimate constitu-
tional change.2 °4
Finally, when the issue is how to judge the validity of constitutional
change, one cannot restrict analysis to standards that are internal to the Consti-
tution. As Frederick Schauer observed, one must judge the process of adopt-
ing a new constitution or amending an existing constitution according to
external standards or higher legal norms, just as courts judge the validity of
legislative action by its congruence with higher constitutional standards."'
If the question is whether the Constitution is defective and needs reconsidera-
tion, the Constitution alone cannot provide the answer. Thus, one cannot
conclude that a constitutional amendment is valid or invalid simply by observ-
ing whether its adoption was consistent with the processes of Article V. One
also must consider whether the method used for adoption is consistent with
whatever social or political standards the public recognizes as legitimizing
constitutional changeY°'
203. See Amar, supra note 198, at 457-60 (noting that 'We the People of the United States
have a legal right to alter our Government").
204. There is some historical evidence to indicate that the Framers intended that the public,
acting on its own, should have the power to amend the Constitution. Id. at 463-94; see Robert
W. Scheef, Note, "Public Citizens" and the Constitution: Bridging the Gap Between Popular
Sovereignty and Original Intent, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201,2231-32 (2001) (suggesting that
because Framers considered "We the People" unrestrained by textual limitations, people of
United States, acting alone, have power to amend Constitution). Other historical evidence,
however, points in the opposite direction. See Monaghan, supra note 202, at 133-47 (disputing
Akhil Reed Amar's interpretation of phrase "We the People").
205. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RE-
SPONDING TO IMPERfeCTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONALAMENDMENT
145, 146-52 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (proposing that amendment process should include
consideration of changes in underlying presuppositions of Constitution). In making his argu-
ment, Schauer draws from Hans Kelsen's discussion of Grundnorm and H. L. A. Hart's dis-
cussion of rules of recognition. Id. at 148-52. For an analysis of Schauer's argument, see Eric
Grant, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 125, 128-31 (1996).
206. To be sure, the amendment process stated in the Constitution may provide reliable
guidance about the process of constitutional change, but only insofar as it correctly reflects the
country's higher legal norms for determining when constitutional change is legitimate. See
Schauer, supra note 205, at 157-59 (discussing society's determination of when constitutional
amendment outside of constitutional text is proper).
What those higher legal norms are is not always obvious, and one needs an argument tojustify any proposed external standard. But the important point is that one cannot restrict the
inquiry solely to an internal, legal analysis of the Constitution. One also must undertake a social
and political analysis of the external standards by which the public judges constitutional
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE CONSTITUTION
Although there are very good arguments for not limiting constitutional
amendment to the Article V methods of amendment, one should hesitate to
conclude that constitutional amendments always are possible by means other
than those specified in Article V. Even if one rejects the idea that Article V
provides the exclusive means of constitutional amendment, one would expect
its processes to be at least presumptively required. °' It is fair to say that our
social and political standards include the idea that Article V is the usual way
by which constitutional change must occur.2"' The Framers of the Constitu-
tion did not suggest in the language of Article V that amendments ordinarily
could proceed outside the Article V process, and this country's social and
political practices since the adoption of the Constitution suggest an under-
standing that constitutional amendments generally should follow the require-
ments of Article V.209
The better reading of the Constitution is that constitutional amendments
generally should proceed according to Article V, but that those procedures will
occasionally, probably rarely, be inadequate. Thus, in exceptional circum-
validity. See id. at 152-61 (discussing constitutional change outside of Constitution itself).
Thus, it is illogical to ask whether the U.S. Constitution was legal or illegal according to
the Articles of Confederation. An existing constitution alone cannot state when it is legitimate
to replace it with a new constitution. See id. at 154 n.20 (discussing argument that current
Constitution is illegal according to Articles of Confederation).
207. See id. at 157-58 (discussing presumption in favor of Article V amendment process).
208. For an argument that Article V provides the exclusive means of amending the Consti-
tution, see David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case ofArticle
V,76 IOWAL. REV. 1(1990). See also John R. Vile, LegallyAmending the United States Con-
stitution: The Exclusivity ofArticle V'sMechanics, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271 (1990-1991) (exam-
ining proposed alternatives to Article V amendment process and rejecting them based on histori-
cal and textual evidence). For a more qualified defense of Article V, see Brannon P. Denning,
Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TEN L. REV. 155 (1997).
209. The Supreme Court has addressed the possibility of non-Article V mechanisms for
amendment on a few occasions and rejected such a possibility. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130, 136-37 (1922) (holding that states may not impose limitations on ratification process not
included in Article V); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-31 (1920) (holding that Article V
does not permit state to require affirmation by public referendum of legislative ratification of
amendment); Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (concluding that state referen-
dum provisions cannot be applied to ratification of amendments to Constitution). However, one
can read these cases as standing for the proposition that states cannot alter the federal-state bal-
ance in Article V, rather than as foreclosing the possibility of popular referenda when Congress
and the state legislatures may be unresponsive to the public will. See Gregory B. Mauldin,
Note, Informed Voter Initiatives and Uninformed Judicial Review Under Article V, 34 GA. L.
REV. 1701, 1723-26 (2000) (noting that Supreme Court's opinions addressing Article V in-
volved power of states versus Congress, not power of people versus their legislators).
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stances, the public should be able to go outside of Article V to amend the
Constitution.2
10
What would count as exceptional circumstances? Voters should be able
to go outside Article V when the mechanisms of Article V are inherently
unreliable. If the standard procedures for amendment cannot work properly,
their use should not be necessary. One important cause of a malfunctioning
amendment process is the presence of a substantial conflict of interest for both
Congress and the state legislatures. Article V requires that a two-thirds vote
of Congress initiate constitutional amendments or that two-thirds of the
state legislatures request a constitutional convention. Moreover, ratification
requires action by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by constitutional
conventions in three-fourths of the states. If a conflict of interest would
discourage Congress and the state legislatures from acting on a public desire
for a constitutional amendment, then Congress and the state legislatures ought
not have the power to frustrate the public will by failing to propose or ratify
the desired amendment. In such cases, the public should be able to enact a
constitutional amendment by satisfying the super-majority ratification require-
ment of Article V.2' Thus, for example, courts might permit ratification of
a constitutional amendment when adoption occurs by popular referendum in
three-fourths of the states.2" 2 This approach would preserve the critical super-
majority requirement of Article V, but would not allow Congress or the state
210. Bruce Ackerman wrote about special moments in U.S. history when constitutional
change occurred without fidelity to Article V. See 2 BRUcE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 7-27 (1998) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in violation
of rules of Article V and that legal changes wrought by New Deal effectively amounted to con-
stitutional amendment).
211. That is, amendment should occur upon approval by the public in three-fourths of the
states. In addition to requiring approval in three-fourths of the states, one also might require
a super-majority vote in each state. But note that in some states a simple majority vote can
approve a constitutional amendment. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-10-5-29 (1998) (requiring
"majority vote of the delegates" at state constitutional convention considering proposed con-
stitutional amendment).
212. It is not clear whether ratification would need to occur through conventions in the
states (the alternative to state legislative ratification being blocked by the legislatures' conflict
of interest). If state legislatures control the convention process, then the public in a state should
be able to demonstrate its approval of a proposed amendment in a statewide referendum. Sup-
porters of an amendment could use a citizens ballot initiative in many states because these initia-
tives do not require legislative involvement. In about half of the states, voters already change
state law by initiative. See Steve LeBlanc, Voter Initiatives Often a Matter of Big Money:
Wealthy Groups Fund Drives to PushAgendas, DEmRorr NEWS, July 24,2000, at 8 (describing
rise in popularity of citizen ballot initiatives). The initiative process readily could adapt to use
for constitutional amendments. For other states, ballot initiatives would require judicial inter-
vention.
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legislatures, because of a conflict of interest, to block a constitutional amend-
ment by failing to act.
One might respond that Article V would lose something important even
if courts preserve the super-majority requirement for ratification. Under the
ordinary amendment process, Congress proposes amendments and state legis-
latures ratify them. Proposed amendments must pass through two levels of
deliberative bodies. As a result, Article V promotes a process of careful con-
sideration before adoption of a proposed amendment." 3 If the public could
pass amendments by referenda, however, there might be concerns about the
sufficiency of public deliberation. The typical voter might not engage in the
constitutional debate.
214
This is a legitimate concern, but it does not necessarily doom constitu-
tional amendment by public referendum. It might be possible, using modern
methods of communication, to develop a national debate, 21 '5 and citizens are
better educated today than they were at the founding of the country.216 More-
over, the super-majority requirement of Article V seems more important than
the Article's mechanisms for ensuring proper deliberation.
Note that bypass of Article V could not occur if Congress faced a conflict
of interest, but the state legislatures did not. Article V already recognizes the
possibility of congressional self-interest and provides some protection against
it. Article V prevents Congress from acting out of self-interest because it re-
quires Congress to convene a constitutional convention when two-thirds of the
states request one.17 Congress cannot reject a call for a convention once two-
thirds of the states support the call. In this way, Article V makes it more
difficult for Congress to aggrandize its authority.1 ' However, Article V does
213. See Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971,1995 (1994) (noting structural characteristics
of Article V).
214. However, it also is not clear that legislators engage in their houses' debates over
constitutional amendments.
215. See Amar, supra note 198, at 502-03 (arguing that because of vast improvements in
communication and transportation technology there may be ways to retain deliberation of con-
stitutional convention while providing for direct popular participation).
216. See Kobach, supra note 213, at 2002-03 (noting that elitist notions of Framers
reflected world in which they lived and that their conception of American citizenry is no longer
descriptively correct).
217. According to Article V, "The Congress,.... on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments ...." U.S.
CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
218. See THE FEDERAUST, No. 85, at 546 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1966) (observing that Congress's obligation to call convention upon request of two-thirds
of states means that country "may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect
barriers against the encroachments of the national authority"); see also Brendon Troy Ishikawa,
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not include a mechanism to prevent the undue operation of a conflict of interest
faced both by Congress and by the state legislatures. Hence, there needs to be
some room for constitutional amendment outside of the strict requirements of
Article V.
219
A conflicts justification for modification of the Article V process ties
well into Article V theory in other ways. Ordinarily, it makes sense to employ
the Article V methods for initiating constitutional amendments because Con-
gress or a constitutional convention can ensure that an amendment is proposed
only after careful deliberation. In this view, the Constitution charges a body
with a national perspective with the decision of when the national constitu-
tional framework needs reconsideration.' 2 However, when legislative self-
interest conflicts with the national interest, Congress and the state legislatures
may not give adequate recognition to the need for constitutional reconsidera-
tion.2
21
If constitutional amendment can proceed outside the strict requirements
of Article V when a conflict of interest discourages Congress and the state
legislatures from initiating the Article V process, when would such a conflict
arise? Two examples illustrate when such conflicts may arise: term limits for
members of Congress and campaign finance reform.
Amending the Constitution: Just Not EveryNovember, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 303,322-24 (1996)
(discussing Article V authority for states to initiate amendment process as bulwark against
tyranny by national government); Kobach, supra note 213, at 1999-2001 (discussing how
concerns about congressional self-interest affected debate over Article V at Constitutional
Convention). Note that this safeguard has limited utility. States desiring a particular amendment
might be reluctant to request a constitutional convention. A convention could propose many
undesirable amendments. Id. at 1996.
219. Kris Kobach discussed how popular pressure at the state level can overcome con-
gressional conflicts of interest. The U.S. Senate resisted the public's desire for popular election
of Senators instead of the Article I, Section 3, Clause I provision for election by the state
legislatures, and Congress proposed the Seventeenth Amendment only after popular election
effectively had been adopted in the country through measures taken at the state level. See
Kobach, supra note 213, at 1976-80 (describing how state initiatives led to systems by which
legislators agreed to abide by public's choices for Senators).
220. See Hawke v. Smith 253 U.S. 221, 226-27 (1920) (observing that both methods of
ratification in Article V "call for action by deliberative assemblies"); see also Ishikawa, supra
note 218, at 306 ("In originating amendments, Congress serves as the single, deliberate body
best able to suggest improvements to constitutional system.").
221. See Amar, supra note 198, at 460 ("Popular sovereignty cannot be satisfied by a Gov-
emment monopoly on amendment, for the Government might simply block any constitutional
change that limits Government's power, even if strongly desired by the People.").
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1. Term Limits for Members of Congress
The public often displays broad support for congressional term limits.
Indeed, by the time the Supreme Court found term limit statutes unconstitu-
tional in US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 2 twenty-three states had passed
such laws by popular referendum.'m
But even with strong popular support, 4 term limits at the national level
are nearly impossible to enact. With the Supreme Court having found state
term limit statutes unconstitutional when applied to members of Congress,
proponents of the limits must turn to the constitutional amendment process as
their sole remaining option. However, Article V of the Constitution requires
that Congress or two-thirds of the state legislatures initiate the amendment
process.' And neither Congress nor thirty-four state legislatures are likely
to push for a term limit amendment. Members of Congress would vote
themselves out of office, and state legislators would put constraints on their
future opportunities - many of them aspire to membership in Congress. More
importantly, state legislators will not want to impose term limits on them-
selves, and therefore, would be unlikely to invite pressure to enact term limits
on themselves by voting for term limits for members of Congress.22 In other
words, the people with authority to enact term limits by constitutional amend-
ment face a powerful conflict of interest that likely will deter them from
acting."27 Article V's mechanisms for constitutional amendment are inade-
quate in the context of term limits. 228
222. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
223. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 78 (1995). The wisdom of term limits is debatable. For a
sampling of the literature, see id.; Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CmI.
L. REV. 83 (1997); Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator,
81 CoRNELL L. REV. 623 (1996).
224. There is some question as to the strength of public support for term limits.
225. U.S. CONST. art V.
226. If voters in the state impose term limits on state legislators by referendum, the
legislators still would be reluctant to support term limits on members of Congress. With their
state office-holding careers shortened, the legislators probably would not also want to limit the
duration of their potential federal office-holding careers.
227. For example, recall how many officeholders have reneged on their promises to accept
term limits voluntarily. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Some Backtracking on Term Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A20 (profiling members of Congress who have reneged on term limit
promises).
228. See Kobach, supra note 213, at 1973-74 (noting that alternative amendment process
is necessary for term limit amendment because direct stake that existing members of Congress
have in existing institutional arrangement makes it impossible to persuade two-thirds of both
houses to propose term limit amendment).
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The conflict of interest not only will discourage legislators from acting,
it also will counteract the usual incentive that legislators have to respond to
their constituents.229 When it comes to term limits, one cannot rely on legisla-
tors' desire for reelection to ensure that they will heed public preferences.
People might vote legislators out of office for not supporting term limits, but
legislators will turn themselves out of office if they enact term limits. A
legislator's chances for a long tenure always are better in the absence of term
limits.230
In sum, concerns about legislative conflict of interest provide a justifica-
tion for permitting a term limits amendment without observing the strict
requirements of Article V. Voters should be able to propose and ratify a term
limits amendment without having to rely on the discretion of Congress or the
state legislatures. 3
2. Campaign Finance Reform
Campaign finance reform is a second issue for which legislative conflicts
of interest might thwart constitutional amendment. After the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 1 2 many elements of campaign finance reform
require a constitutional amendment for enactment. However, one can question
whether members of Congress or the state legislatures would carry out their
constituents' desires for a constitutional amendment that would implement
campaign finance reform. Incumbents tend to benefit from the current cam-
paign finance system, and so generally will not see campaign finance reform
as furthering their interests. Moreover, as with term limits, the usual need to
respond to constituents may not adequately counteract the influence of per-
sonal interest. If legislators support campaign finance reform, they may do
229. Cf Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("The wisdom and the
discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections... are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all repre-
sentative governments.").
230. Some legislators might serve longer by supporting and enacting term limits. If their
constituency strongly supports term limits, the legislators might have to support term limits to
gain reelection. Even so, it remains that a legislator's prospects for a long tenure are always
better without term limits.
231. I mentioned above how public pressures at the state level sometimes can overcome
congressional conflicts of interest with respect to Article V. See supra note 219 (discussing
popular pressure at state level). However, the Supreme Court has made it difficult for the public
to exert its pressure for a term limits constitutional amendment. In Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S.
510 (2001), the Court prohibited states from adding to congressional ballots statements reflect-
ing a candidate's non-support of a term limits constitutional amendment.
232. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE CONSTITUTION
more damage to their prospects for reelection (by helping their opponents) than
they would if they opposed campaign finance reform.
On this issue, the conflicts argument is less clear than it is for term limits.
Many incumbents dislike the current system of campaign financing, with its
constant demand for more fundraising, and Buckley reached the Supreme Court
precisely because Congress enacted measures to reform campaign financing
in 1974. Congress passed new reform measures in March 2002." 3 Still, it is
not clear that Congress or the state legislatures would be willing to bring
forward a constitutional amendment to override Buckley. Indeed, campaign
finance reform in the states has proceeded primarily by voter initiative.2 4 In
short, while good reason exists to think that voters ought to have the option
to use non-Article V methods to incorporate campaign finance reform into a
constitutional amendment, the case is weaker than the case for a term limits
amendment.
Whether the public should be able to go outside Article V only for term
limits or also for campaign finance reform, the important point is that conflict
of interest analysis is a solid answer to the question of whether Article V
provides the exclusive means for amending the Constitution. When a conflict
of interest would discourage Congress and the state legislatures from acting
under Article V, constitutional requirements should not stymie the public.
IV Conclusion
This Article has argued that conflicts of interest deserve a much greater
role in constitutional interpretation than they currently enjoy. Conflicts entail
the same core concern about abuse of governmental power that underlies the
233. See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81(amending various sections of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,2 U.S.C. §§ 431-
455).
234. In Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts, voters adopted campaign finance reform by
referendum. See Carey Goldberg, Court Upholds Maine Campaign Law, N.Y. TUMls, Nov. 9,
1999, at A14 (reporting on decision of federal court to uphold law that offers incentives for
candidates to take public money instead of private contributions). In Vermont, the legislature
enacted campaign finance reform. See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459,462-63 (D. Vt.
2000) (finding Vermont campaign law's limits on contributions to candidates and political
parties constitutional, but limits on campaign expenditures and contributions from political
parties to candidates unconstitutional), a ffd in part, rev 'd in par4 and remanded, Landell v.
Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (this Second Circuit opinion has
been withdrawn at the request of the court pending further proceedings and possible amend-
ment). Similarly, the Connecticut legislature passed a campaign finance reform bill in April
2001, but the governor vetoed the bill. See Paul Zielbauer, Rowland Vetoes Bill Setting Limits
on Campaign Spending, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at B5 (noting that governor's explanation
for vetoing bill was that it raised serious First Amendment concerns).
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separation of powers doctrine. Consideration of conflicts therefore readily
ties into findamental constitutional principles.
Given its connection to a core constitutional value, one would expect
consideration of conflicts to provide important insights into constitutional
interpretation, and this Article's arguments show how it can do so. Taking
account of conflicts can provide answers to three important constitutional
puzzles. It can give a strong functionalist theory for separation of powers
cases, it can resolve the tension between judicial supremacy and the political
question doctrine, and it can indicate when constitutional amendment may
proceed outside of Article V.
Has this Article exhausted the role that conflicts of interest can play in
constitutional interpretation? Probably not. Conflicts concerns can arise
whenever Congress, the President, or the courts exercise their authority.
Further thought by other scholars and the author of this Article likely will
yield other constitutional questions that can be better understood from the
perspective of conflicts of interest.235
235. One might expect conflicts of interest concerns to be important for challenges to a state
legislature's reapportionment of voting districts. Currently, legislatures redraw district lines in
ways that protect incumbents rather than in ways that would make elections more competitive.
See Samuel IssacharoffIn Real Elections, There Ought to Be Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2002, at A19 (expressing dismay at redistricting process ran by political insiders). Conflicts of
interest analysis could provide a strong basis for courts to impose nonpartisan methods of
redistricting.
